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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Central Eurasia**

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***Military Affairs***

# Central Eurasia

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-92-024

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1 July 1992

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## CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

### Problems of Personnel Relocation from Republics

92UM1140A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
16 Jun 92 First edition p 2

[Interview with Major-General S. Safonov, chief, Personnel Directorate, Volga-Ural Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel O. Bedula: "Under the Russian Sun: Thousands of Commonwealth Officers and Warrant Officers Seeking Placement"; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The process of "militarization" of CIS people has inflicted on the Armed Forces a disease: migration of the officer corps. This disease tends to progress with every passing day. "Circumstances" are forcing thousands of officers and warrant officers to find a new assignment. This is also the situation in the Volga-Ural Military District.

Our correspondent spoke with Major General S. Safonov, chief of the district Personnel Directorate, on the subject of what is being done to assist servicemen who find it necessary to come to the district.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Stanislav Ivanovich, never in the last few years have I ever seen so many officers and warrant officers in the directorate's visiting room, offices, and corridors. They seem to represent all branches and age groups, from young lieutenants to gray-haired colonels. What are they waiting for, and what do they hope to gain?

[Safonov] They are trying to do something about their future. They come here for a variety of reasons. For most of them, it is refusal to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine and Moldova. So, day in and day out we sit them down, interview them, and, as a rule, find an assignment for more than 30 of them. This, with the influx steadily on the rise.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] I could not help but notice that the servicemen awaiting interview look unusually angry and preoccupied.

[Safonov] What do they have to be happy about? The present time for them is one of dashed hopes, despair, uncertainty about the future of themselves and of their families.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But some of them do walk out of the building wearing an expression of a bright outlook.

[Safonov] Definitely. We attempt to help as much as we can. Since December, we have found assignments for more than 500 men. However, in some cases there is nothing we can do. The trouble is, we presently find it possible to place servicemen into officer primary slots: artilleryman, PVO [Air Defense] specialist, communications officer, transportation officer, engineer, but when it comes to locating vacancies for officers of major to colonel rank, slots are virtually nonexistent. Most of the incoming officers fall into that category.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Does that mean that there generally is little hope of finding them an assignment in the district?

[Safonov] In the third and fourth quarters of the year, 511 senior grade officers presently on active duty will be discharged into the reserve. This means that we can accept just that number of officers. However, a problem here in the case of officers arriving here from, say, Ukraine, is that they must be granted an immediate transfer.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What seems to be wrong there?

[Safonov] We maintain direct communication with the Personnel Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Officials tell us that, as far as their side is concerned, there are no obstacles to the release of the servicemen. The delay is due to the troop reorganization under way there.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Other than Ukraine and Moldova, which of the other Commonwealth countries are officers and warrant officers leaving?

[Safonov] There has been a sharp increase in influx of servicemen from the Turkestan Military District. Also losing personnel are the Transcaucasus Military District and the Western and North-Western Groups of Forces. However, it seems that the authorities of the Turkestan Military District are the only ones who make official arrangements for departure, in that they grant officers and warrant officers an average of 10 days. In the other cases, it is every man for himself. Sometimes parents attempt to do something, many times wives, also. But it is possible to resolve the problem by telephone. I can even supply you with the number: 32-91-88.

There is another aspect. Many officers, apparently unfamiliar with the personnel resolution procedure in place, try to bypass us to find an assignment in an area. They hope to find support from old acquaintances and rely on luck. If they are unsuccessful, they become disappointed and return to their place of departure. I would like to say once again that we have directed all military units and installations not to deal with anyone on a personal basis as far as an assignment is concerned. Only the Personnel Directorate possesses the authority to handle cases of transfer or placement of a serviceman. This is also necessary so that we can maintain current knowledge of all vacancies. In addition, we are always in a position to offer the officer or warrant officer several assignments. The choice is then up to him.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Stanislav Ivanovich, what do you do to help incoming senior officers possessing a length of service qualifying them for a pension?

[Safonov] We look at the circumstances of each case. I must admit, however, that we advise most officers of that category to take a discharge into the reserve.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Can you give an example of the kind of circumstances you take into account?

[Safonov] Family considerations, for one. For example, we recently located an assignment as section chief in a rayon military commissariat for a Major N. Aleksandrov. He, with 23 years of service and 42 years of age, served last as political worker in the PVO troops. What we took into account was that Nikolay Ilich had three children in his

family and lacked a civilian specialty. We located an assignment at his place of origin. The local authorities of Koshkinskiy Rayon in Samara Oblast lost no time helping him acquire housing and rendering assistance in resolving many other problems.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What about placing officers in an unofficial assignment? Would this be of any help in relocation of servicemen?

[Safonov] That is something we started to do as early as last year. We presently have several hundred men occupying slots not shown on the table of organization. All those assignees were "planted" to fill slots vacated by officers who had been discharged, so that they can try to learn the associated details of the duties. The "planting" of a third officer is forbidden by law.

I must say here that assigning an officer to an unofficial slot ordinarily constitutes a severe change as far as nature of duty is concerned. Examples of this are commanders of units and subunits, chiefs of staff, chiefs of services.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] We have been discussing only those servicemen coming into the district. Are there cases of officers requesting relocation from the district to other countries of the Commonwealth?

[Safonov] There are. We have received requests from 320 men for relocation to Ukraine, for example. However, only 65 have departed so far. A number of them are vacillating, waiting to see what may happen. Also, some men made a trip to Ukraine, had a look around, and made the final decision not to stay there. I wish to emphasize here that each man is free to do as he sees fit. We impose no restraints of any kind and apply no "educational" measures whatsoever.

However, there is something I must say here. The Ukrainian Army leadership does not lay out the welcome mat to all officers of Ukrainian origin. The republic issues invitations only to officers whose service is beyond reproach. The conclusion here is that all others need not apply.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Recent political events have created a knotty problem with respect to officers of Armenian and Azerbaijani origin arriving from the Transcaucasus and requesting assignment in this district. What lies behind this unusual—for them—request?

[Safonov] Those officers were faced with making a critical decision: divorcing their Slavic wife and losing their family, or leaving their homeland. They chose the latter. Incidentally, there is quite a number of such officers, and we in all cases attempt to render assistance.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Most of the incoming officers and warrant officers come to feel the full brunt of the social shortcomings. As far as I know, plans for future housing construction do not make any provision for what amounts to an explosive influx of officers and warrant officers.

[Safonov] Those plans have been modified. We supply the district Billeting Directorate with monthly figures on incoming servicemen. We have already worked with local agencies of seven republics and 10 Russian oblasts to arrive at an estimate of the housing requirement. Incidentally, they

have already satisfied part of their obligation to us, in response to the well-known decree issued by the President of Russia.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Do you suffer any fears that the influx of servicemen can turn into a flood?

[Safonov] That is what in reality is happening. Who could have predicted that Ukraine would at once resolve the issue of the military oath and refuse to retain in service officers and warrant officers who choose not to take the oath? Moldova went the same route. Will that also hold true for Belarus and the Central Asian republics?

Following the logic of political development, the above problem should be resolved in talks held by the leaders of the Commonwealth countries or by persons authorized to act in their stead. On the contrary, decisions are being made on a unilateral basis. It is a good thing that the Main Personnel Directorate and the Ground Forces Personnel Directorate have dealt with this situation by granting us wide latitude in resolving the many problems associated with handling the uncontrolled influx of people. However, the trouble is, the volume of work has tripled, but the number of personnel performing the work is the same as before. We have never seen such a work load.

Be that as it may, we intend to welcome, interview, advise, and do all we can to assist all servicemen in need of help.

**Netkachev Appeal Following Death of 18-Year-Old Soldier**  
92UM1179A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 23 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Nikolay Panyukov: "14th Army Commander Yu. Netkachev: Tired of Hostage Situation"]

[Text] All manner of things are being said about the behavior of personnel of the 14th Army stationed in the Dniester area, and all kinds of accusations are being hurled at the command authorities. The following is what General Netkachev, the army's commander, has to say.

The military does not want to be drawn into this war, but intensive efforts are being exerted to do just that. We—the military—find ourselves being held hostage to dangerous political games. We are tired of playing this role.

There was an 18-year-old soldier killed today. What did he do to deserve such an end? What did his parents do to deserve such a misfortune? Why all this suffering here by officers and men, by the families of servicemen, who are being subjected to ceaseless gunfire and attacks by raiding parties? I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to speak out for these people and once more appeal to the leadership of Russia and Moldova, and to all CIS states, to gather immediately around the conference table to put an end to the senseless slaughter occurring here.

## CIS: POLICY

### Critique of Grachev's Force Generation Program

92UM1154A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 25, 17 Jun 92 p 11

[Article by Vasiliy Selyunin: "In the General's Baritone: Concerning an Interview With Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev"]

[Text] Of all the products of the collapse of the Soviet empire, the most unpleasant one is of course the disintegration of the army. Literally overnight it became redundant with respect to the performance of the sole function of any army—defending the country—for the fundamental reason that the power that created it had faded into oblivion. Demoralized, deprived of the very reason for its existence, and incapable even of protecting the arms with which it has been entrusted, it is increasingly turning into a free arsenal that is being used to supply regional units and even gangs of thugs.

As legal successor to the Union, the new Russia could not allow such a turn of events, which would pose a fatal danger to all the former empire's peoples. It took under its jurisdiction, and later, with the creation of its own Ministry of Defense, under its direct command the troop units deployed not only on its territory, but also in various trouble spots and in distant countries from which the forces must be brought home. I think that the peoples and governments of the new states will soon realize and appreciate the kind of burden that Russia has sacrificially taken upon itself in undertaking to maintain contingents that, generally speaking, it does not need. For the inordinate share of the armed forces that it has inherited can at best serve only as raw material, as a resource, for a fundamentally new Russian army.

What kind of army will that be? Or, to put the question more sharply, what future does the newly created Defense Ministry see for the Russian armed forces? We received what could be termed an exhaustive answer in the interview with Minister P.S. Grachev that was published in IZVESTIYA on June 1. You will agree that the concept of the army is a concern of not the generals alone, and not even of the government alone. As taxpayers, you and I are also entitled to have a voice. And so let us take a closer look at the proposed arrangement.

First of all, as regards the size of the force. As far as one can judge from the statements of the president and his most authoritative military advisers, Russia needs an armed force with a maximum of 1.5 million men. That is a considerable force. Let us recall that on emerging from the civil war, the army's strength was cut from over 5 million to roughly 600,000 and that, in foreign authorities' view, after Frunze's military reform we had one of the best armies in the world. Let us also bear in mind that it served not just Russia, but the entire Soviet Union. Still, let us accept the proposed figure as a basis: In the final analysis, 1.5 million troops amounts to one soldier for every 100 Russian Federation inhabitants, which is in keeping with "world standards."

In the lengthy interview, General Grachev does not accept or reject this figure; indeed, he doesn't cite a required manpower figure at all. True, on the basis of vague hints one can speculate that the number of men under arms will in any event be fewer than the number that Russia is currently maintaining on its own and foreign territories. But this is at some point in the future. Meanwhile, what is of importance from a practical standpoint is not future models (if need be, they can always be revised), but the current program of action. Here the minister's position is unequivocal: to maintain, at all costs, the current strength of the contingents under Russia's jurisdiction, and to replace discharged personnel with new mobilizations. He complains of a large shortage of personnel in the armed forces: "The autumn call-up went very poorly for us, and we expect the spring call-up to be even harder." He goes on to say: "Unless some fundamental document is adopted on army conscription, only 26 percent of the required number of new recruits will enter army service this year. This means that the army's strength will be reduced by another 10 to 15 percent."

There is absolutely nothing new in these pronouncements. Not long before the August coup, then USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov, at a session of the Supreme Soviet, revealed to the country: "If conscription continues to proceed in this manner, by the end of this year (1991—V.S.) the Armed Forces' strength will stand at 79 percent of the required level." The marshal reproached young people: "Using any pretext, young men are trying to become students" and, in such an unbecoming manner, to evade military service. General Grachev condemns the same thing: "Today the government is receiving more requests than ever before from administration chiefs, entrepreneurs, sheep-herders, reindeer breeders—you name it—who request deferments from military service or exemption altogether. Don't draft private farmers, don't draft subway builders..." (Let us appreciate, dear readers, the general's brilliant irony. Sheep-herders, reindeer breeders, subway builders and entrepreneurs have taken it into their heads that their miserable occupations are more important to the fatherland than army square-bashing. What idiots!)

From the Minister's subsequent comments, we learn a surprising bit of news: Even if a "fundamental document on conscription" is adopted and scrupulously implemented, Russia's people are unable to meet the army's needs because "the number of young people of draft age fails to meet these requirements."

Stop! We need to take a minute here to grasp the full grandiosity of the general's thought. As we know, the death rate in our country is no longer being offset by the birthrate. As a result, the population is aging. And if the number of people of draft age is already insufficient today, what is going to happen when this aging process intensifies? Where will the required number of soldiers be found if the women haven't given birth to them? It would seem to be an impossible task. But not for generals. For them, hopeless situations do not exist.

The minister sets forth a fascinating plan. As he put it, in the past Central Asia alone supplied the army with 40 percent of the total number of conscripts. The continuing demographic

explosion to be observed there creates an inexhaustible reserve of conscripts, and General Grachev is prepared to use them in area of responsibility with which he has been entrusted. The only thing that must be avoided is sending Uzbeks to an unaccustomed climate, say, to the Northern Fleet. And that's all there is to it.

A Russian army into which people from other states are drafted—how do you like that? And there is another subtlety here. Russia's natural population decline is taking place unevenly by region and nationality. The overall negative balance consists of a decrease in Slavs, especially Russians, and very rapid increases in the Moslem population (needless to say, we are only happy for the latter). Given this breakdown, in an army whose manpower is acquired on the basis of compulsory conscription, Russians will inevitably come to account for an increasingly smaller relative proportion; taking into account the hypothetical conscripts from Central Asia, the Russian force will come to be staffed predominantly by non-Russians; in other words, it will not be in keeping with the national composition of our Federation.

The minister compounds this flaw by proposing a principle that is not traditional for our army: As a rule, soldiers will serve in the areas from which they are called up. In praising this innovation, the general, I submit, is trying to portray necessity as a virtue—conscripts are unwilling to go far away from home, and one has to accept realities. But in taking this approach, isn't the minister preprogramming internal army conflicts into his concept for the future armed forces? After all, troop units from the local populations of the territories of large autonomous entities, given the right confluence of circumstances, could lay claim to the status of independent armies, and in that event, I fear that Russia could repeat the fate of the Soviet empire.

The solution suggests itself: a professional army. I would argue that the conditions for its creation are ideal. It would not be hard to select a well-trained corps of commanding officers from among the officer corps that is currently holding rallies and throwing around its weight for want of anything better to do. There are so many professionals among junior officers that a competition would actually have to be held. And there are no doubt more than enough personnel among the enlisted ranks who would like to make a career out of military service. With a smaller force, there will be enough apartments and barracks. Weapons are no problem either—there's plenty to choose from. And most importantly, history has given us the time to conduct such a reform: Nobody is threatening Russia today. Such a favorable situation might never repeat itself.

However, our new minister once again puts this task off to the future, which is to say forever, to all intents and purposes. He cites some suspicious figures for the costs of such a reform, without telling what method was used to arrive at them; we are simply supposed to accept them on faith, as if maintaining three servicemen is cheaper than maintaining one. His plans call for conscripting young women for compulsory service, since there aren't enough young men. Such steps have been taken only in wartime.

Why do the generals need an army of unlimited dimensions? The minister's statement should not be taken seriously: "A

strong army enhances the people's self-respect." First, a strong army is not necessarily an enormous one, and second, one can think of ways to enhance our self-respect by other means—such as through an abundance of life's amenities. The minister has more practical objectives.

To start, he paints an impressive retrospective. In the good—but by no means old—days, "the primary strategic trampoline for subsequent offensive actions" was situated on the western frontiers of the Warsaw Treaty states. That is where our elite troops were stationed, forces intended to penetrate defenses—with a sixfold superiority over the enemy. "Later," P. Grachev continues, "when, very quietly, in connection with the destruction of the Warsaw Treaty, all this began to collapse and the GDR reunited with the FRG, the main line of defense was pushed back to our state border." But the general couldn't restrain himself here either: "We find ourselves in a situation that is truly unprecedented; the Moscow Military District has in effect become a front-line district. This is simply incomprehensible."

On the other hand, something else is perfectly comprehensible: "...the rapid creation of a new Smolensk Military District, which would become the first strategic echelon in conjunction with the Leningrad and North Caucasus districts... But I no sooner proposed the idea when people called me an aggressor and a militarist. I have tried to prove my point, but without success as yet." But our strategist is not depressed: "I think that things will nonetheless work out in the near future."

What unescapable nostalgia for empire! The Warsaw Treaty was not swept away by the will of peoples—you see, someone quietly destroyed it. Lest there be any doubt, the general goes on to say with military directness: "We took a defeatist decision when we began withdrawing the Western Group of Forces after concluding with Germany an agreement to pull the troops out within four years. What's the rush? The Americans promised to do the same thing within 15 years."

It seems, however, that the general is beginning to understand: It wouldn't be a bad idea, just to be on the safe side, to keep the force in Germany for 15 or so years, when the situation would be clear [a tam vidno budyet], but it isn't up to us. As they say, If you're leaving, leave. But on other fronts, in the Baltics, for example, the "German and Polish mistakes, I'm convinced, should not be repeated. The troops should be redeployed without being rushed or subjected to psychological pressure on someone part." And if that "someone"—i.e., the peoples and legitimate governments of those sovereign states—nevertheless do exert psychological pressure? The general has considered this possibility: Psychological pressure is no match for arms: "The army, if its vital interests are infringed upon...can take countermeasures. It could get out of my control."

What is this, if not open blackmail? The general seems to be advising the army to take unsanctioned actions, provoking it to take "countermeasures" in hopes of turning back history. It looks like people had good reason to call him an aggressor and militarist. Good reason!

It's not hard to foresee how events will unfold. You know, it's a bit uncomfortable to live under a sword hanging by a hair, and at the right moment, the Baltic states will try to join the Western military bloc and to acquire protection under someone else's nuclear "umbrella." And then the Atlantic rampart will lie adjacent the border of Great Russia—and not in the general's imagination, but in actual fact. And once again we will bristle with bayonets—this time alone—against the whole world. Who benefits from such a turn of history? Surely not us—in a besieged fortress, people usually don't introduce democracy or reform an economy.

And who benefits from the minister's projected strategic echelon on the approaches to Moscow? Since he intends to create the new military district at once, it is clear that the "Grachev line" will not be countering Western imperialism, the potential adversary is closer. Can the general seriously believe that our western neighbors will look on the hypothetical theater of military operations through opera glasses with nothing more than curiosity? Ukraine and Byelorussia also have their share of macho generals. Let's call a spade a spade: An attempt is being made to impose an exhausting military confrontation on the Slavic states, and Russia is taking the initiative in this through the lips of its military minister.

Speaking to the country and the world in a general's baritone is thinkable only if one senses he has power behind him. And the minister knows who his supporters are. They are, first of all, the officer corps of the former Union army, who have been thrown out of work. No, one can't envy the fate of that officer corps. And one should say to them honestly: No one can give you back the state you served; after all, an army is created for a state, not a state for an army. Whoever fails to pass the competition for the Russian armed forces should look for another line of work. Look around—criminals are running rampant in the country, it's dangerous to go out on the streets, and police forces everywhere are short of personnel; we have several times fewer police officers per 1,000 residents than the civilized countries. Surely this is a potential vocation for officers, warrant officers, and sergeants. If they don't like that, there's lots of other things to do. But they needn't strike a pose and expatriate on their oath to the motherland. The motherland is near death, half-starved and in tattered clothes; to demand that it give up its last resources to defend against mythical enemies is, you'll excuse me, akin to plundering.

We are not hearing such speeches from the minister. In making plans for total conscription up to and including foreigners and young women, he is clearly telling the officers: You are not threatened with discharge, go about your work without concern.

The general's program for the military-industrial complex will also be very much to their liking. In the most powerful sector of industry—machinery manufacturing—eight of every 10 workers in our country is engaged in either making weapons or making equipment for making weapons. Arms production employs metallurgists, chemists, farmers, oil workers—in short, all Russia. The fate of the former union offers convincing proof that a state in which fish costs more than an armed soldier cannot exist. And yet the first attempts to demilitarize the country's economy met with

desperate resistance. In January through March of this year, the state appropriated 6.6 billion rubles for military orders, while the defense complex blithely pounded out 20 billion rubles' worth of weaponry. And as it turns out, it was right in doing so: If the Russian army's strength is to be no less than that of the former union army, it can't be armed with sticks. Once again, it is being proposed that we live without trousers but with missiles.

Finally, General Grachev's plans are truly balm for the wounds of the few but surprisingly noisy groups that demand the immediate return to Russia of lost territories in every direction. These people who live in the past are deceiving the Russians who live in the new states, and yet the latter have to live in these countries. To the delight of these revanchist ringleaders, the minister declared the other day: "I have already said repeatedly that my positions are very tough. If the honor and dignity of the Russian population in any region are encroached upon, I will take decisive measures, up to and including the introduction of troops, to prevent discrimination, attacks, and other hooligan sorties with respect to the Russian population (IZVESTIYA, June 5).

What is this supposed to mean? Is Russia any place where Russians are present? Does this interpretation also apply to Poland, for example, where there is also a sizable Russian colony? To Ukraine? If the range of "the most decisive measures" is confined to the autonomous entities within Russia, it doesn't make any difference: Will the Russians be grateful for such support? The consequences of tough actions are too familiar.

As we can see, the minister is pandering to destructive strata of society. And we have no right to scornfully dismiss this, to say that they have no future and won't go far in the carriage of the past. The fact is that a new and extraordinary dangerous element has appeared in the political situation. Such diligent efforts were made to intimidate us with the prospect of a military coup that we're no longer scared. Indeed, after the August debacle, it is highly unlikely that anyone would try to take the risk again. But a coup is when generals, in conjunction with outsider politicians, declare themselves to be the highest authority. The defense minister was appointed by legal means. The other new ministers who come from the military-industrial complex are also pushing the reformers into secondary roles in a completely legal manner. Breathing down the necks of the reformers' team, which is losing real power, is a shadow cabinet that represents the interests of that same military-industrial complex. These people are already anxiously counting the days until posts are vacated for them. The "order party" in the Supreme Soviet has strengthened its positions.

We are obviously seeing a consolidation of antireform forces at the highest level—forces that never lost their influence in the middle and lower levels of administration. These people have understood nothing and learned nothing. One doesn't have to be a prophet to predict that the president himself will become a hostage to this entourage.

I want to issue a warning: We are at a critical, fateful juncture.

## CIS: GROUND TROOPS

### Defining Number of Fire Targets

92UM1072B Moscow VOYENNYY VESTNIK  
in Russian No 8, Aug 91 pp 35-36

[Article by Colonel S. Korotkov under rubric "My Opinion Concerning...": "I Suggest Another Variant"]

[Text] The existing procedure for determining the number of targets to be displayed in accordance with the fire capabilities of subunits and the allocated amount of ammunition was criticized among the troops even earlier, but such a methodology is hopelessly obsolete with adoption of a defensive military doctrine in the USSR, and the Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate is in no special hurry to issue new recommendations on this matter.

Meanwhile, experience confirms that even scientifically substantiated quantitative "norms" for targets to be displayed must be updated periodically.

Just what are the drawbacks of existing methodology for creating a target situation? In my view, they lie above all in the fact that it is developed in the standard way. If the topic of the upcoming tactical exercise—let's say it is a company tactical exercise—provides for defensive combat operations, then it is not difficult to predict its basic indicators. The frontage is up to one and one-half kilometers, the enemy is up to a motorized infantry battalion, and so on. No problems here, as they say. But then they inevitably arise in figuring the requisite amount of ammunition for reliable target damage. As a rule, there must be considerably more ammunition than envisaged by existing documents. People seek a solution in different ways. Some try referring to weather conditions, time of day and concentration of fire. Others distribute targets among weapons, change distances to them or reduce the overall number of targets displayed. What happened to destruction of the enemy at maximum ranges and compliance with other basic principles of his fire damage?

Or, for example, where did the requirement originate for damaging at least 70 percent of displayed targets with a grade of excellent? And what if the company ends up on the enemy axis of main attack and two battalions begin advancing against it? In another case, the company may not be at full strength by the field-fire phase. In actual battle of course the senior commander will immediately take necessary steps, such as inflicting specific damage on the enemy with other weapons, but usually one cannot count on this in exercises.

To the contrary, many examples will be found in troop practice where well trained subunits were evaluated as "unsatisfactory" based on field-fire results. The reason for this is that combat missions are unrealistically assigned to subunits and the number of targets exceeds their fire capabilities (in view of the ammunition limit).

In the situation at hand it would not appear superfluous to direct attention to the following. What if, in developing the target situation diagram, we determine the number of targets not for the subunit as a whole, but per weapon, taking into consideration here the strength level of the company or battalion? Let us say ten tanks are taking part in a company night tactical field-fire exercise. At this time of day their range of effective fire will correspond to the range of vision of night sights. If it reaches 850 m in the passive mode and 1300 m in the active, then the mean range of fire can be taken as the arithmetical mean between the range of effective fire and the cease-fire line as determined by the Gunnery Course for each kind of weapon, i.e., the mean range of fire from a tank gun ( $D_{mean, tg}$ ) will be  $1300+400/2=850$  m; from a PKT [Kalashnikov tank machinegun] ( $D_{mean, pk}$ ) will be  $500+200/2=350$  m; and from the NSVT [expansion unknown, possibly tank-mounted antiaircraft machinegun] ( $D_{mean, ns}$ ) will be 900 m.

Applying the data obtained and the corresponding Gunnery Course table, it is possible to determine the necessary ammunition expenditure for damaging a target displayed at the mean range for conducting fire: 2 rounds for the tank gun and 10 cartridges each for the PKT and NSVT.

It is not difficult to figure the fire capabilities of a tank ( $FC_{tank}$ ) using the formula  $M(tgt)_{mean}=N/M(n)$ , where  $M(tgt)$  is the mean expected number of targets which can be damaged by each weapon with the allocated amount of ammunition or in a certain (prescribed) time;  $M(n)$  is the mean ammunition expenditure for damaging one target (determined from Table 1.2 of the Gunnery Course);  $N$  is the amount of ammunition allocated for firing (no more than specified by the corresponding order).

For this we can use the formula  $FC_{tank}=FC_{tg}+FC_{pk}+FC_{ns}$ , where  $FC_{tg}$  is the fire capabilities of a tank gun, equal to damage of 3 (6/2) targets;  $FC_{pk}$  is the fire capabilities of a PKT, equal to damage of 10 (100/10) targets;  $FC_{ns}$  is the fire capabilities of the NSVT, equal to the damage of 0.5 (5/10) targets.

$$FC_{tank} = 3 + 10 + 0.5 = 13.5 \text{ targets.}$$

On the whole, fire capabilities of the tank company ( $FC_{tc}=M(tgt)N_{wp}$ , where  $N_{wp}$  is the number of weapons) will be  $10FC_{tg}+10FC_{pk}+10FC_{ns}=135$  targets. Of these,  $FC_{tg}$  is 30,  $FC_{pk}$  is 100 and  $FC_{ns}$  is 5 (table). The fire capabilities of other subunits can be figured in exactly the same way.

Table

Weapon	Number	Consumption Allowance Per Weapon	Mass Range of Fire	Consumption Expenditure Per Target	Fire Capabilities of	
					Targets	Subunit
125-mm tank gun	10	6	1300-4000/2	2	10/2-1	3x10-30
76.2-mm PKT	10	100	500-2000/2	10	100/10-10	10x10-100
12.7-mm NSVT	10	5	900	10	5/10-0.5	0.5x10-1

Often subunits are not brought in at full strength in the field-fire phase. The Gunnery Course (p. 38) does not provide precise recommendations on this score. This leads to where the number of targets is determined approximately for understrength subunits. With respect to motorized rifle companies and battalions, even the amount of ammunition is determined for now not per weapon, but for the subunit as a whole. This means their expenditure also is established irrationally, to put it mildly. How can a subunit be evaluated objectively here? It remains to hope that this problem will be resolved sooner or later.

The proposed variant for calculating targets and evaluating subunits according to their fire capabilities will, with further development, enable achieving a higher level of field proficiency and a considerable economy of ammunition. It permits constantly considering qualitative and quantitative changes of subunits, precludes a stereotyped approach to the work of exercise directors, and reduces the need for revising the Gunnery Course and other fundamental documents.

**FROM THE EDITORS.** In our view, the suggestions expressed by the author are of some interest, although of course they are not indisputable. Therefore we invite specialists to express their opinion.

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### CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

#### Letter, Commentary on Worsening Air Force Safety Record

92UM11594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
19 Jun 92 First edition p. 1

[Letter by VVIA [Military Air Engineering Academy] imeni N.Ye. Zhukovskiy Student, Captain A. Zarudny and commentary by Deputy Editor for the Air Force Military Training Department, Colonel A. Andryushkov: "We Are Flying Less and Less. We Are Crashing More Frequently. Won't Russia Become Wingless?"]

[Text]

#### A Reader's Postscript to a Recent Tragedy...

The retorts of the parting salvos had fallen silent and the odor of gunpowder had dissipated into the sunny spring sky, but the bitter taste of the irreplaceable loss will trouble the spirit for all of our lives. My comrades, strategic long-range aviators, died near Saratov on May 16.

The state commission is still working, but no matter what caused the deaths of the 11 men from the two tanker crews,

one thing is clear—they paid with their lives for the country's peaceful skies in these troubled times.

Before entering the academy, I flew with the commander of one of the deceased crews. I am familiar with the feelings of aviators who occasionally ascend into the sky because they were not provided with fuel on the ground. I understand a pilot's smile when he responds to the doctor's question: "How did you rest?"—"Everything's fine", when you were up past midnight talking with your wife about how you will make a living if you have to leave the Air Force due to Armed Forces reductions. A flight does not begin with the takeoff, but with thoughts and feelings. And you can't get away from them, even at 8,100 meters.

Major S. Chalyapin's aircraft was still climbing to that flight level on a course from Engels to Semipalatinsk when, 36 minutes into the flight, a second tanker commanded by Major A. Sayuk, began to form up with him to fly further as a pair. And at that moment the worst thing happened, a midair collision.

A 12-meter section was torn from the control surface of Chalyapin's aircraft. The commander gave the crew the order to eject. Not all were able to do so or to use the rescue systems. Among them were Captains A. Mostovskiy and G. Arkhipenko and Warrant Officers Yu. Fedotov and V. Yezhov.

Major Sayuk's tanker exploded in the air a few seconds after the collision. Majors A. Sayuk, V. Sirokin and I. Kuselev, Captain K. Dovranov, Senior Lieutenant V. Litsov and Warrant Officers L. Vasilenko and V. Shcherbich died.

The wreckage of the aircraft fell over a 28 kilometer radius in the military district. The dead aviators fell to the warm earth in twisted steel. It was as if even after death they spared the living; not a single resident was injured. One home was destroyed and there was minor damage to the roof of a boarding school.

Seven of the eleven dead were laid to rest for eternity in a common grave in the Engels cemetery. Since 1954, its soil has become a resting place for military fliers. An eternal flame burns at the Officer's Club—a memorial to those who have not returned from flights during peacetime. The names of 11 more men have been added to the concrete wall. Flowers will be brought to them and rumors will circulate that the cause of the deaths was an error in the crew's flying technique. But how could that not be, since my friends are getting less and less flying time? And for the time being no

one has taken away the basic function of protecting Russia's powerful elites at any price. They are having to do more and more often.

#### — And Other Commentaries

The military pilot's letter was sensational, but you try being anti-national while raising threats. General Zvezdochkin has already named the cause of man's inhumanity in the sky today: economic and social chaos. My own 25 years of service in the Air Force gives me the right to draw the conclusion that the accident rate in aviation is threatening us shift from national disasters to a landslide. I will not reveal figures for the greatest pertinence.

In 1991, there were 16 accidents in aviation units. There have already been eight accidents in the first three months of this year. Twenty-three servicemen have died in them. No one has calculated the total material loss from flying accidents but, according to the experts, it is estimated to be more than a hundred billion rubles.

If we turn to the primary flight safety indicator—the number of flying hours per flying accident, even as compared to last year, it has declined by more than 50 percent in aviation of all branches of the Armed Forces.

The reliability of the men in the air has correspondingly fallen by as much. It has been proven, if a fighter aircraft has less than 150 flight hours per year, then, like the combat pilot, it is not totally prepared. And when an emergency situation arises, it is not always possible to make an intelligent decision. In 1991 in the Air Force, units of several aviation regiments could not carry out even the minimum flying hour standard—40 hours. It is in these aviation units that we have noted an increase in the number of flying accidents.

"The accidents with the two tanks" said Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Aircraft and Flying Safety Service Chief Colonel-General of Aviation Ye. Romanov, "probably occurred due to pilot error in flying technique and due to the reduction of training levels to carry out difficult tasks. The crews themselves are the least guilty in all of this."

The problems of the aircraft accident rate have always been at the center of attention of the country's government and the Armed Force's command authorities. Serious and threatening norms have been adopted. Everything in them was correct and intelligent. But, as before, aircraft continue to go down. People are dying. No matter how "intelligent" the document might have been, if it was not materially reinforced but was just supported with loud speeches, appeals and war tactics, it made little sense. Proceeding based upon foreign experience of work on reducing the accident rate in aviation, today Russia needs a national program which would provide for a long-term series of measures for training cadets for development of the aviation industry and for the economic and social protection of aviators. Such a program was developed in the United States in 1988 (in that year we were equal in the number of flying hours per aircraft a incident, 100,000 hours). We rested on our laurels and today we have an accident rate that is twice as high as the United States and with many times fewer flying hours.

In our country, material support of such a massive flying safety was always replaced by administrative efforts on accidents. The result of aircraft accident investigation commissions have stated, as a rule, with the designation of a "blameless" in whom they hang all the blame for what occurred. The greater the responsibility of the flying accident, the wider the circle of officials who were designated as guilty. The culprits were left in the background and the accident "car" driver was driven underground. And during their next flights, aviators once again paid the highest price for the Russian state's powerful elite—both their lives.

It should not go unnoticed that, if it does, Russia may become stronger.

## CIS NAVAL FORCES

### SSN Repair Chief Capt. Ilya Raskin Romanov

Interviewed

CCM-Moscow, Moscow MINISTRY OF DEFENSE  
in Moscow No 4, July 1991

Interview with the Chief of the Department for Integrated SSN Repair under the Main Directorate for Operations and Repairs of the Navy. Captain of Russ Ye. Romanov. By Captain Ye. Raskin B. Tsvetkov. "The SSN—in Retirement. For How Long?"

(Text)

[Editor] Evgeny Grigorievich (Russia), please tell us how the problem of scrapping the Navy's nuclear ships is being solved now?

Romanov) At present the Navy, as they say, is going one-on-one with this problem. What is the reason for this? The fleet ship-repair facilities have not yet dealt with this problem and their capacity does not meet their demands which would ensure the prompt scrapping of the nuclear subs and even their preparation for scrapping. In addition, there are other circumstances which exacerbate this problem such as for the scrapping of the SSN it is essential to unload the nuclear fuel and other radioactive wastes, and this in turn requires the availability of special storage facilities and equipment and the fleet up to now has had an acute shortage of these.

[Editor] From what you have said it becomes clear that the "removal" of the nuclear sub is being carried out in a planned manner that is, in addition to the boats which have already accumulated up to now, additional ones can be expected in the foreseeable future. How do you view the SSN what is their technical state and what can be done with them under the conditions of the dwindling difficulties?

Romanov) Basically at the present time the SSN which have been withdrawn will soon be, we see, those of the first generation which were built and commissioned at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's. These are submarine-carrying and multipurpose (or "pure" torpedo) SSN. The oldest of them are the subs of the "Leningrad-Komsomol" class (Des. 627) and these were commissioned in 1958 and subsequent years. Actually the problem of scrapping the SSN arose in our fleet from the mid-1980's

and contracts with the crews of that submarine. What has been done to reduce the cost of decommissioning them from the fleet? (Q) In all the decommissioning of nuclear ships of the Soviet Navy, the cost of decommissioning is the same. This is due to the fact that when these boats are decommissioned, there occurs a large-scale cleanup of the submarine to ensure safety. In particular, due to the corrosion damage to their hulls and to a large number of ships, the cost of an upgrade in the nuclear boats is high. There is no need to excessively "clean" out with a reactor and fuel using the boat's own reactor. Thus, from such boats, a nuclear submarine after a nuclear upgrade, the economic costs of the required expenditures in some respects increase because there is the removal of the fuel and radioactive waste of some boats.

According to the work results of the interdepartmental commission in the Ministry and the Navy Fleet in 1990 and 1991, the Navy has worked out a plan for the decommissioning of the decommissioned boats. But this will not allow these activities not to continue but even to expand. One of the main ways of decommissioning the ships is the cost, including for the Navy. The only way out that presents in the problem is beginning to gradually increase the possibility of scrapping the boats at the yards of the Navy shipyards.

As the operational and technical work in the decommissioning of these boats, together with the fleet yard and the manufacturing plants, we have taken a number of measures making it possible to exert that the safety of the "second" SSN at present is reliable. However, all the boats with reduced service times (from 1990) have approached the proper monitoring of the state of the reactor and maintain the required normal level of the radioactive radiation in the boat.

(Tsvetkov) What are the proposals for scrapping and preparing the ships for decommissioning, storage, and then such work already being done in the fleet?

(Bulatov) The fleet yards are doing such work. However, during the current year, we plan to reduce the amounts of these costs since a great deal of financial instruments is needed to carry out what is planned. Up to now these funds have not been officially provided for the Navy. We are carrying out this work in the framework of the fleet ship repairs, or more precisely, at the expense of the ships which are in operation and which require additional materials and drydocking for maintaining their technical combat readiness.

It must be remembered that in 1990, the Department for the Integrated Affairs of Nuclear Arms under the Main Directorate for Armaments and Equipment of the Navy approved a Special Program to support the decommissioning of the SSN ships with the involvement of ministries and departments of the Russian USSR. This Program was put into effect by a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, however, neither during the existence of the USSR nor subsequently was the main function fulfilled of allocating general funds, although the Program should have been "up and running" in 1991.

In January of the year the commander of the Navy, Fl. Adm. V. Chernyaev, together with the Russian Minister of Industry, Yu. Tikhonov, visited the shipbuilding enterprises of the Russian Navy, where they became acquainted with the "present" of the development of the nuclear submarine fleet.

Among the problems raised was that one of the special funds [Upon the return of the ministries and agencies instructions to implement the Program, considering the formation of the new structures of the basis of the former Union ministries and departments which had now been put under Russian administration. However, at the present, they still have not ensured the main function of whether or not the Russian Government will allocate the required funds for implementing the designated Program].

Let me add the following. We are perfectly aware that under these conditions, which our country is currently forced to work, there are no surplus funds and the necessary funds, if they are of the same provided, will be taken from the pockets of the taxpayers. But if in the near future we do not begin to carry out this Program, then the situation will become more and more complicated with each passing year and namely from the viewpoint of the ecological situation in the spot. If we do begin to carry out the Program, then beginning in 1992-1993, the number of "second" SSN will begin to decline.

(Tsvetkov) Here finally we have reached one of the most crucial and painful questions in the national war: that of ecology. Very often I am asked, please repeat more thoroughly just what ecological problems arise in the scrapping of the nuclear boats?

(Bulatov) In the national war, I would say, this is now the question of questions. The problem is that up to now Russia has not officially the "SSN" program but did not have an authority approach to solving the problem of handling the radioactive wastes. Each department or agency which has such specific wastes did and does decide all the questions related to their destruction independently. It cannot be said, though, that the work of every uniform views and positions by the involved parties was not carried out. In 1991, a draft was worked out for a State Program for Handling Radioactive Wastes for the Period 1991-1995 and over the long run to the year 2015. It could not be implemented by the Union leadership. The problem has remained and now the Russian Gosatomnadzor (State Committee for Nuclear Inspection), upon the orders of the government, should during the current year work out an analogous program. A co-worker from our department, Capt 1st Rank A. Tsvetanov has taken part in working out the program on behalf of the Navy. However, even at the stage of creating the draft of this Program, our proposals were not taken into account. For "conceptually" this Program again assumed a departmental approach in handling the radioactive wastes.

In our opinion, the State Program should provide for the establishing of a special unit assigned to carry out the measures in collecting, packing, transporting, processing and subsequently burying the wastes and the depleted nuclear materials. This sector should have the required capacity for processing these wastes as well as regional "graveyards" for burying the products remaining from this processing.

Moreover, we feel that in solving this problem "in a state-like manner" we must also turn to foreign experience. For example to the U.S. experience! There, so far as we have learned, within one of the ecological programs, beginning in

1992, the Department of Energy which has control over the enterprises in the military nuclear complex, will begin to create and subsequently introduce fundamentally new technologies for a system for the storage and handling of radioactive wastes. For this over 30 billion dollars are to be allocated from the federal budget up to 1996! It is planned that this program will be carried out by the states with the participation of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency and under the overall leadership of the U.S. Energy Department.

[Tyurin] Thank you for participating in our talk. We shall be discussing this problem in the future on the pages of our journal. We have invited other Navy representatives to participate in the dialog as well as the relevant civilian departments and organizations which are vitally involved in its positive resolution.

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### CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

#### Finance Directorate's Problems With Personnel Costs

92UM1167A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 May 92 p 1

[Interview with Central Finance Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General Vasiliy Vasilyevich Vorobyev by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Correspondent A. Krayniy: "The Battalions Are Begging for Rubles"]

[Text]

#### Our Correspondent Talks With Central Finance Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General V. Vorobyev

[Krayniy] Vasiliy Vasilyevich, honestly speaking, recently the editorial staff's military department has been almost paralyzed—we have been forced to answer calls and read numerous letters which contain one and the same question: where is the money? Here is a letter from Severomorsk, from officers of military unit 59126. The officers write that they are ready to carry out and are carrying out their military duty to the Homeland under St. Andrew's flag, but their children and wives have not been fed, roughly speaking, for two months.

[Vorobyev] This is today's most burning and critical issue. I begin and end my day with it. It has reached the point that we are having to send cash to garrisons using military transport aircraft. Incidentally, these airplanes just left for the Northern Fleet and Leningrad Military District. We are airlifting money in a similar manner to the territory of Turkestan Military District, Siberian Military District and other military districts nearly once per week. People must receive what they have coming to them: there is no question here, but look at what the situation is in the country.

I would like to ask servicemen to understand the situation that has developed in Russia and to manifest restraint and patience. Believe me, we, the Central Finance Directorate, are doing everything possible and impossible and we at times are coming to resemble a fire brigade.

[Krayniy] Well, good, let's assume, although I do not understand how, that the problem will be resolved with the cash the government has on hand. But, really, the salary, or speaking of the military, the monetary salary of an officer is, excuse me, paltry.

[Vorobyev] In the majority of the world's countries, the profession of a regular military officer is among the most prestigious and well-paid.

This permits manning the armed forces with highly qualified cadres who conscientiously and professionally carry out the assigned missions. It was always that way in the Russian Army. The Russian Government is striving to do this. But we are not keeping up with the civilians. On 1 February, we raised salaries, but it "wore itself out" in March-April. And in May we have once again already noted that servicemen's incomes are lagging behind those of workers who are employed in other spheres.

Today, a platoon commander, after four years of study at school, has a higher education and, as a rule, an abnormal working day, is entrusted with the fates of tens of people, and he receives a little more than 2,000 rubles for his labor. But a metropolitan laborer has an average salary of up to R2,500, a production section foreman receives more than R5,000 and a bus driver more than R6,000. I am already not talking about the income of workers of leased enterprises and commercial structures. But take pay based on military rank. That was an incentive. But now a lieutenant and colonel receive almost the same salary based on rank and this money is barely enough to purchase two kilograms of boiled sausage.

We understand very well that it is difficult for the Russian leadership, which has assumed responsibility for practically all of the expenditures for the maintenance of the Armed Forces, to resolve the army's and navy's social problems that have accumulated under conditions of the acute economic crisis. At the same time, it is in no way possible to permit a further reduction of servicemen's living standards. Otherwise, the Armed Forces may lose their most qualified cadres. Last year more than 20,000 officers were released from the Armed Forces due to staff reductions and the absolute majority of them expressed the desire to leave military service.

Already today we are experiencing difficulties with manning military units that are located in the Transcaucasus, the Baltic Region, and the Republic of Moldova, and one of the causes of that situation is social, since servicemen are often compelled to leave their families in other regions, often in private housing. But who would dare take his dear ones to where they would be constantly in danger?

[Krayniy] But how, in general, do you maintain the interest of those who are not serving in the "Arbat Military District"?

[Vorobyev] The Russian Minister of Defense has just signed an order raising the monetary salaries of servicemen who are serving in some remote locations and regions with severe climates. This decision has permitted us to eliminate the discrepancy which has recently developed in the pay of servicemen and workers in the national economy who are serving and working under severe climactic conditions or far from their Homelands. Beginning 1 July 1991, in a

number of locations in Arkhangelsk and Kemerovo oblasts, in Altay Republic, in arid and desert regions, servicemen's salaries will increase by 50 or 30 percent (instead of 15 percent), i.e., at the same rates, or close to them, that have been stipulated for all other citizens. In a number of locations, these increases will be newly introduced if they are established for workers in the national economy.

The order increases the maximum increases for continuous service at remote locations or at those with severe climactic conditions to the level stipulated for civilian personnel.

[Krayniy] But, Vasiliy Vasilyevich, at times the state has no money; is it possible to take advantage of the assistance of social funds, since there are quite a few of them?

[Vorobyev] You know, there really are many funds, however, their assistance to the army has not been great so far. We need to search for new ways to mobilize the resources to solve the most acute social problems in the army. After all, for example, today a commander cannot help a subordinate who has found himself in extreme day to day circumstances: fire, natural disasters, a child's severe sickness. What can a commander do! Even at the center, we frequently do not have the required finances, especially in hard currency.

It seems to us that the need has arisen to create an extra-budgetary fund for social support of the army within the Armed Forces itself. It could be formed from the voluntary contributions of servicemen, organizations and citizens, social funds and income from authorized types of commercial activities.

#### Food Shortage at Priozersk ABM Test Range

92UM1168A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 5 Jun 92 p 6

[Article by Sergey Kozlov under the rubric "The Province": "A Closed City Is in Decline"]

[Text] Priozersk is staffed with weapons. Its residents have forgotten the taste of milk.

The closed, secret city of Priozersk on the shore of Lake Balkhash in Kazakhstan's Dzhezkazgan Oblast is not shown on any map. The city grew out of a military post, the construction of which was begun in the Betpak-Dala desert in 1956 approximately 30 kilometers southeast of the Sary-Shagan railway station. Priozersk subsequently became the center of an enormous nuclear and chemical test range with an area of 8.1 million hectares occupying parts of Dzhezkazgan, Aktyubinsk, Dzhambul and Kzyl-Orda oblasts. The largest Soviet testing complex for ABM defense was located here. It is where, in 1961, an airborne ballistic missile was destroyed for the first time. Furthermore, the Soviet missilemen beat the Americans by several months, which had a considerable impact upon the latter.

During all of these years the city by the lake has remained a mystery to the residents of surrounding areas. Rumors that it was in the first category for receiving supplies from Moscow upset the community, which was certainly not pampered with respect to food. In addition, there was the rumble of explosions taking place, both above and beneath the earth...

The elite graduates of military educational institutions assembled at this gigantic laboratory, which former Soviet Colonel Penkovskiy once "sold" to the Americans. More than 95% of the officers at the garrison are graduates of military academies. These are specialists in electronics and computers, laser and missile technology. Marshal Ustinov's son began his service here. The famous designer Lavochkin worked and died here. Until recently testing on the F-300, the most modern of missile systems and counterpart of the American Patriot, was conducted here. And even though American experts who visited the range in 1990 did not give a very high rating to our achievements in technology, they gave the highest of marks to the overall scientific capacity.

Left to the mercy of fate after the USSR Ministry of Defense ceased to exist and the military-industrial complex collapsed, the city went into a decline. Its 35,000 residents have sunk into mass depression. They have not seen margarine in a year now, they receive butter once a month and get no milk at all. There are long breaks in the supply of bread and other food items. There has been no heat in 5,000 of 7,000 apartments. The municipal services cannot cope with the city's needs. The basements in 80 buildings have been flooded with fecal-contaminated water for going on four months, and the people have long since forgotten what hot water is. "Against the background of overall collapse we might not seem so different from the others," Yuriy Gasumits, deputy chairman of the city council, says, "but the trouble is that there are just too many weapons here."

Garrison officers and enlisted men—mainly from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus—are well aware that no decree issued by President Nazarbayev on the establishment of a local, republic army can ensure the maintenance and functioning of the extremely intricate complex. Desertion from the place is therefore not just not condemned; it is actually encouraged. Individuals and entire military units desert, with the military equipment and everything they can haul off, ignoring the above-mentioned decree, which forbids the removal of military property without the knowledge of the Ministry of Defense.

An alliance of concerned people of Kazakhstan, with Boris Luzin as its chairman, have promised the city 20 million rubles for emergency needs. No one knows how long the suffering of this unfortunate offspring of the VPK [military-industrial complex] will go on or what will become of its neighbor, a station for tracking space objects which is serviced by 7,000 people.

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

## Attacks on Russian Transcaucasus Units

92UM1181A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
25 Jun 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Colonel V. Gavrilenko: "Stop Shooting at Russian Sentries!"]

[Text] What you see in the following table is a sad picture of the "treatment" accorded Russian troops stationed in the Transcaucasus. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was provided the data by the Faks news service of the newspaper ZAKAVKAZSKIYE VOYENNNYE VEDOMOSTI.

## ARMED ATTACKS ON MILITARY UNITS OF THE TRANSCAUCASUS MILITARY DISTRICT

	Year 1991	Year 1992
Total	215	207
Azerbaijan	43	98
Armenia	78	38
Georgia	94	71

## NUMBER OF RUSSIAN ARMY SERVICEMEN KILLED

	Year 1991	Year 1992
Total	24	30
Azerbaijan	8	11
Armenia	8	6
Georgia	8	13

## NUMBER OF WEAPONS STOLEN IN ATTACKS

	Year 1991	Year 1992
Total	404*	4076
Azerbaijan	218	3939
Armenia	131	73
Georgia	49	64

[\*As reported]

It goes without saying that the above statistics are sad. What is the first thought that comes to mind in looking at the figures? The fact that the Russian troops stationed in the Transcaucasus are suffering unprecedented plunder. Even a quick comparison reveals that there is a yearly increase. And an increase in number of deaths.

Who and what is being attacked? Guard details, sentry posts, duty details, patrols, and individual servicemen. The purpose is the plunder of weapons, ammunition, and equipment. The attacks may be by an individual, group, or subunit of legally constituted or legally unrecognized units. The attacks are initiated unexpectedly, boldly, with reliance on the element of surprise. In some cases, an ultimatum is given. In even fewer cases, the attackers initiate their activity by indicating an intention to negotiate, for the purpose of having equipment and weapons handed over to them, on the basis that the latter "rightfully belong" to them. And, if you do not comply with their demands, well,

you have only yourself to blame for whatever happens, according to them, because the materiel will be taken, anyway.

The offer of the abovementioned "negotiations" is usually made so that later it may be said that "we were promised that the weapons would be sold to us, but then an attempt was made to take advantage of us by quoting exorbitant prices." That is why the decision was made to "punish" the obstinate Russian military. That is what happened in Armenia and in Artik. That is also what came out of an investigation of the tragedy that occurred in Gori.

The Russian is a trusting person. It is a national characteristic. This characteristic, multiplied by years of being brought up "in a spirit of brotherhood and friendship between peoples of the USSR," can at times lead to a relaxation of vigilance. The attackers utilize that to full advantage. However, they are finding fewer and fewer opportunities of doing so. The soldier presently on duty cannot be won over by a bright smile and a hearty "Hello there, friend!" That is why there has been a change in tactics of the attacks, which are now launched suddenly, in darkness, with use of weapons without warning. That is also why there has been a change in nature of soldierly duties. The guard is normally posted in a foxhole or some other protected position; he wears body armor and is equipped with a radio set. The former casualness is completely gone; the rule now is to expect attack. Whereas we used to go through the motions of reading that "guard duty constitutes the pursuit of a combat mission," we no longer act lightheartedly when we read this.

As far as the matter goes, the casualty count for the attackers is also high. Higher than that listed above. I hesitate to predict future tragedies, but that count will rise. The Russian troops are offering the bandits' attacks more resistance with every passing day. There are many examples of this.

The above should be kept in mind by those who set out to commit a villainous act and by those who provide the inspiration and then attempt to furnish a cover-up or justification for the act. However, is it really possible to justify the acts of bandits—of those who break the law? As soon as someone fires a weapon or attacks a guard, he has then and there become a criminal. And if he is struck down by a bullet fired by a soldier on duty, well then, forgive me! The trouble is, just who will be the one who will go and explain the death of the attacker to the latter's mother?

A person cannot help but sympathize with a mother. But there is something here that is not clear: The kind of fanaticism, cruelty, and disrespect for the oath and duty to which Russian soldiers are sworn that are exhibited by some hotheads as they charge against the soldiers' automatic rifles. Is this done to seize weapons to wage justifiable combat for the sake of national interests? That is the very reason the Russian soldier is issued a weapon. Is the purpose to achieve one's ends by committing an injustice? Is this a way to assure some kind of lasting justice? As far as my knowledge goes, there is nothing in the historical traditions of the Transcaucasian peoples that would call for committing an injustice to attain justice, or an illegal act to attain a

legal goal. And the situation in the Transcaucasian republics is such that a guard on duty there is a symbol of the Russian soldier.

The time may come when the Russian soldier will leave the Transcaucasus. On the other hand, he may not, by virtue of honoring the will of the peoples there. This has occurred quite a few times in the past. Each case was like the ebb and flow of a tide, in that a small nation would encounter difficulty and find itself on the brink of extinction. It would then appeal for help to the Russian soldier, who would come and save the people. Life would then become normalized, the danger would vanish, and there would be an emergence of forces that would inspire the people. Then events would reoccur. The present must be a time of an ebb; one of many misunderstandings and troubles. But have the particular people involved in a particular matter thought everything through? Judging by what the people's politicians are saying and doing, it is difficult to arrive at any understanding of this. It may take some time to do so. But for the present: Stop shooting at Russian sentries!

## UKRAINE

### Directorate Chief Reviews Problems of Military Transport

92UM1163A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
28 May 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel Aleksandr Vadimovich Nikolskiy, chief of the Military Transport Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, by Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov under the rubric "First Interview at the New Post": "Military Transport Operations Under the Conditions of a Sovereign State"]

[Text] Aleksandr Vadimovich Nikolskiy was born in Siberia. His father was Russian, his mother Ukrainian. He was drafted into the military in 1969, after completing the Novosibirsk Institute for Railway Transport Engineers. He served in the Siberian, Central Asian and Kiev military districts. He is a graduate of the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transport.

[Klyuchikov] What problems is the Military Transport Directorate of the Ministry of Defense having to resolve in the situation in which the borders of sovereign Ukraine are becoming more real by the day and losing their former intangibility?

[Nikolskiy] First of all I want to point out that the directorate deals with more than just rail transport operations. It also handles military road and motor transport matters. The combining of these functions under a single directorate had no precedent in the former structures of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The separation of these functions into individual directorates with no limitations either in numbers of personnel or in funds made it possible to focus more closely on the assigned missions, to be sure. Frequently, however, this separateness greatly hampered the adoption of effective decisions on the movement of troops and military freight.

This is precisely why, when we were forming the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a situation the administrative structures were being curtailed, the decision was made to establish a military transport directorate.

Now, about the problems.... Most of them were caused by the fact that the rail lines were traditionally built as a single system administered and supplied from a single center. It was a very difficult thing to single out one part of that system and get it to operate just as efficiently. And this is exactly our task in the situation in which Ukraine's borders with other CIS states are becoming more and more concrete.

The difficulties were exacerbated considerably by those disloyal moves taken by the command element of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. A 4 January 1992 directive of the chief of the General Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, for example, halted the loading of military freight under the Ministry of Defense's plan for shipments to recipients located on Ukraine's railways.

The removal of military property from Ukraine to Russia began at the same time, according to people's deputies of Ukraine and to the security service. We had every justification for taking rigid retaliatory steps. It is important to stress the fact, however, that the decree issued by the president of Ukraine "On the procedure for redeploying military formations and military establishments located within and outside of Ukraine" did not impose a ban on the removal of all military freight out of the state but simply required that such shipments be coordinated with the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of Defense.

It was very difficult to establish control over military transport operations, since the formation of the Ministry of Defense was only in the initial stage. This is why the shipment of military freight out of Ukraine practically came to a halt. However, this did not last long. Representatives of the Central Military Transport Directorate came to Kiev. Working jointly, we were able to conclude a temporary agreement on the procedure for planning and executing military shipments into and out of Ukraine.

A working group was set up later, consisting of representatives of all the supply directorates and services, to establish control over military transport operations. This group is still functioning. It has made it possible, on the one hand, to secure military transport operations for fulfilling the production and economic plans of the military units, and on the other, to prevent the removal of equipment, weapon systems and other military property.

Life itself rescinded the absurd directive of the CIS Chief of the General Staff. Gradually, allowances were made for the exchange of armored equipment, and now fuel for the Strategic Missile Troops and the Black Sea Fleet has been included.

Here are some figures. While 684 car were shipped out of Ukraine and 96 were shipped in during the month of January, the ratio in April was 332 to 158.

We are trying to establish the operation of the military transport directorate on a solid legal foundation, avoiding overly arrogant acts and dangerous confrontation.

Together with the personnel agencies we are purposefully resolving the problem of staffing our structures with competent specialists. We have on record around 200 officers who want to return to the homeland from other CIS countries, and 15 have already been transferred to us. Colonel V. Bondarchuk from the Turkestan Military District, Lieutenant-Colonel I. Shevchenko from the Transbaykal Military District and Lieutenant-Colonel M. Pozdernik from the Moscow Military District are now serving in our directorate, for example.

We have sent out enquires on several dozen people. In addition, we are getting 40 VUZ graduates.

[Klyuchikov] And how is the situation with respect to motor-transport operations? As you mentioned above, their management has been assigned to you.

[Nikolskiy] The sharp rise in the cost of rail shipments and the transition to a market economy have forced military managers as well to count every kopeck. It turns out that in many cases in Ukraine, which has a fairly extensively ramified road network, it is far more economical to deliver freight by motor transport—door-to-door, as they say. The absence of loading and unloading operations makes this type of transport far less expensive. Furthermore, it frequently saves a lot of time.

To these three factors (speed, economy, good roads) one can add the fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have the necessary quantity of motor transport. All of this opens up broad possibilities for motor-transport operations. What their future will be depends upon us, upon our ability skillfully to apply the positive factors.

There are also hindrances, however. In the first place, our directorate lacks motor-transport officers with a good understanding of the planning and execution of this type of transport operations. We pin great hopes on officers being transferred to our army from other CIS states.

In the second place, our motor-transport units are almost 100% equipped with motor vehicles made outside Ukraine. This creates great difficulties with respect to the acquisition of spare parts and new equipment. And there is no point in even discussing the problem of acquiring gasoline.

A third problem is one shared by the organizations for all types of military transport operations. I refer to the absence of adequate communication with the transport organizations. It sounds trite, but the fact is that in order to arrange scheduled transport operations and direct them effectively, it is essential to have a reliable and ramified communication network with all the parties involved.

[Klyuchikov] Now I would like to go into some detail about the procedure for travel by servicemen and their families as defined in Ukraine's military laws. This matter is especially urgent on the eve of summer leaves and because of the return of Ukrainian officers to the homeland from other CIS states, which is already underway.

[Nikolskiy] Yes, our directorate receives a considerable number of letters also concerning this matter. I must say that representatives of the military transport directorate

were very much involved in the process of working out the draft decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on social and legal protection for servicemen and their families. I expect it to be passed soon, giving life to the law of the same name.

When we worked out our focus for the draft, we tried, based on our personal experience and on suggestions from servicemen, to see that it included those provisions which would truly provide social protection for the servicemen.

Let us examine those suggestions in detail.

The right to travel at the expense of the Ministry of Defense is to be extended to the following:

a. higher officers and their families:

—by rail, in upholstered cars with two-passenger compartments (sv [sleeping cars]) on any class of train;  
—by air, on aircraft with first-class compartments;  
—by motor vehicle, in upholstered buses.

b. junior and senior officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, extended-duty personnel and female military personnel, and their families:

—by rail, in cars with compartments;  
—by air, in common-class compartments;  
—by motor vehicle, in upholstered buses.

The above-mentioned military personnel and their families are authorized to travel by maritime or river transport when these types of transportation are the only means of travel and when it is less expensive to travel by these types of transportation.

Family members of servicemen who enjoy the benefits of traveling and shipping household items are those individuals who are listed in the personal files of the servicemen: wives (or husbands), their minor children, disabled children in categories I and II, dependent fathers of servicemen and their wives, fathers over the age of 60 years, mothers over the age of 55, disabled parents in categories I and II.

Servicemen are authorized to travel at the expense of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine by the shortest direct route once a year when going on regular leave. It is planned to extend this authorization also to the families of servicemen, regardless of whether they travel together or separately to their leave destination.

We are proposing that members of the families of servicemen who live separately from the servicemen be authorized to travel from their place of residence.

For the transition period we plan to continue authorizing servicemen and their families to travel free to the site of their regular leave and to travel to their new station at the expense of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine within the borders of the former USSR.

The adoption of these suggestions would make it possible to eliminate those inconsistencies and the obvious inequities which existed in the previous regulations governing travel by servicemen.

I will underscore once again the fact that I have discussed only our recommendations. Time will tell which of them

will be adopted and which will be rejected by the Cabinet of Ministers. Nonetheless, your readers may rest assured that the military transport directorate will do everything possible to see that the interests of the servicemen and their families are given maximum consideration.

**First Congress of Union of Officers of Ukrainian Diaspora**

92UM1163B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
29 May 92 p 1

Interview with Oles Babiy, adviser to the Ukrainian National Assembly, by Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov under the rubric "A View of the Problem": "Why is a Congress of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora Being Convened?"

[Text] The First Congress of the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora will be held in Kiev on 7 June. All the delegates will assemble in Dynamo Stadium at 10:00. Just what kind of new public organization is this union? Who supports it, and what are its goals? Oles Babiy, adviser to the Ukrainian National Assembly, answers these questions for our correspondent.

[Babiy] The main objective of the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora (SOUD) is to return to the homeland the real heroes, those who will form the backbone of the Armed Forces of Ukraine presently being formed. We know that 300,000 officers and warrant officers, citizens of Ukraine, are presently serving in the armies of the CIS states. Many of them find themselves in a very difficult situation. They are drawn into bloody conflicts and forced to fight in "hotspots" in the interest of others. They are discharged as soon as they express a desire to return to the homeland. I could cite hundreds of examples of this. It is confirmed also by the tens of thousands of requests received by the Ministry of Defense.

Many of the servicemen have the opinion that the fatherland does not need them, however, that no one awaits them there. An officer who does make his way to Kiev by hook or by crook can go from one office to another without finding mutual understanding.

This impression is wrong, but it is very difficult for individuals to break through the wall of indifference in the officials and engage in a political struggle for the seats of party leaders. Only by uniting can we rapidly resolve the matter of returning all the Ukrainian servicemen to their homeland.

Unfortunately, the Ukrainian Officers' Union is not taking a resolute position in this matter. This is why we are calling for the establishment of the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora. This would be the organization to resolve our acute problem. For example, the Baku regional SOU [Ukrainian Officers' Union] has succeeded in transferring 300 officers to the Ukraine. They all took the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine in Independence Square and were accepted into the armed forces. This organization, headed by Colonel Slyusarev, could serve as the foundation for the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora.

[Klyuchikov] What methods does the SOUD plan to use to achieve its objective?

[Nikolskiy] The union will realize its goal through radical action. The people are tired of all the promises and no longer believe in the delusion of a wonderful future. The SOUD will promote equality for all Ukrainian servicemen, both those now serving in its armed forces and those returning to the homeland.

And we should not pointlessly insist that a citizen of the Ukraine can only be transferred to its armed forces after he has served out his service term and been discharged or wait for a reduction in the grouping of forces in Ukraine. SOUD will work to get a main certification commission established, which will select the best specialists on a competitive basis. The rest of the servicemen will be released or permitted to serve in the armies of other states.

[Klyuchikov] Will this not exacerbate conflicts in the military?

[Nikolskiy] On the contrary. The inclusion of true patriots in our armed forces will only strengthen them and make it possible to solidify them with a feeling of love for the history and culture of their people. Recent events have shown that far from all the servicemen who have sworn allegiance to the people of Ukraine are a reliable support in the defense of our state's interests. Our army needs an infusion of new and healthy forces.

I believe that we need resolutely to strengthen the Armed Forces of Ukraine and stop all talk of a large cut in their numerical strength. This would be absurd given the territorial claims which are being made more and more frequently and openly. Only a powerful and well-armed army (including nuclear weapons) can rid neighbors of the temptation to redraw the borders to their benefit.

**Draft Program of Ukrainian Officers' Union**

92UM1163C Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian  
4 Jun 92 p 3

[Program of Ukrainian Officers' Union]

[Text]

**I. General Provisions**

The Ukrainian Officers' Union (hereafter referred to as SOU) is an independent public organization of generals, admirals, officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, and cadets in the final year at schools of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Army and Navy, National Guard, SBU [Ukraine Security Service] and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]) who are for the building of an independent, united Ukrainian state, the formation of national armed forces and the securing of social and legal protection for servicemen.

SOU backs constructive proposals of the Supreme Council, the president and the government on these matters. In the absence of decisions and proposals on the part of state agencies and officials, SOU will initiate new proposals and will insist on the timely implementation of laws and decrees passed on matters of developing the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

SOU advocates constructive talks on the basis of equality among the ministries of defense of the CIS states on the immediate return to the Armed Forces of Ukraine of all military personnel who are citizens of Ukraine and desire to return.

With respect to the development of the armed forces and the establishment of effective social and legal protection for military personnel, SOU advocates extensive cooperation with all democratic parties, movements and societies and with military-patriotic and religious organizations which are in agreement with the program and charter of SOU, based on the principles of sovereignty of the Ukrainian state, democracy, Christian all-forgivingness and equality before God and Ukraine.

SOU advocates international ties with democratic movements and officers' organizations of other nations which recognize Ukraine's sovereignty and whose goal is peaceful cooperations.

SOU functions on a territorial basis. Its foundation consists of primary organizations set up in residential neighborhoods, which are joined into city, rayon and oblast organizations and organizations at the service sites, the latter being joined into SOU organizations of military units, formations, large formations and military educational institutions.

SOU permits individual membership.

The restructuring of SOU was necessitated by increased activeness on the part of patriotic-minded officers, military units, formations, large formations, military establishments and VUZs, which are not able to take an active part in the development of a national army of Ukraine due to the specific nature of their military situation.

The tasks of the reorganization are the following:

- extensive discussion and ratification of SOU program documents (programs, the charter).
- systematic definition of the functions of primary SOU organizations;
- determination of areas for interaction with the command elements of military units, officers' assemblies and other organizations, while protecting state and military secrets and current military regulations of Ukraine.

## II. Main Directions and Tasks of SOU

SOU considers its main task to be that of establishing the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

For this purpose it will:

- II.1. take an active part in the writing of legislative enactments of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on the development of the armed forces;
- II.2. influence the conduct of personnel policy and the staffing of various military structures with highly competent military personnel devoted to Ukraine, preventing favoritism and incompetence, relying on the most active SOU members through their membership on certification commissions;

II.3. assist the ministry of Defense in the building of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through the development of a creative, scientific approach to and direction for the development of each branch and each troop arm of the armed forces;

II.4 take part in the development of and work toward the observance of intergovernmental agreements on the concept for transferring military citizens of Ukraine to the homeland;

II.5. promote the establishment of an effective system of legal and social protection for servicemen and their families, and retraining for those released into the reserve;

II.6. promote a rebirth of the military-patriotic instillation of true self-awareness, pride in the sovereign state and respect for its history, state symbols and language;

II.7. for the purpose of providing economic assistance to the state with the establishment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, assume the commitment to set up commercial structures for acquiring extra-budgetary funds and their expenditure on the social and economic needs of the servicemen.

## III. SOU Participation in the Development of Legislative Enactments

III.1. SOU advocates the rebirth of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as one of the main guarantees of the independence of its people, based on the principles of professionalism, reasonable adequacy and subordination only to Ukrainian authority.

III.2. SOU works out alternative concepts for legislative enactments on military matters.

III.3. SOU sees to the publicizing in the armed forces of legislative enactments passed or being developed through the primary organizations, the mass media and its own printing agency.

III.4. SOU takes an active part in the development of military regulations taking into account national military traditions and in the designing of the uniform for the national Armed Forces of Ukraine.

## IV. SOU Activities in Personnel Policy

IV.1. SOU sees to the establishment of certification commissions in military units, establishments and VUZs, and ensures that the most active SOU members participate in them.

IV.2. SOU promotes the manning of all the armed forces stationed in Ukraine only with citizens of Ukraine.

## V. SOU Activities in the Military

V.1. SOU bases its activities in military matters on the requirements set forth in laws of the Ukraine on the development of the armed forces.

V.2. SOU activities are aimed at supporting the efforts of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine to build a reliable defense of the state sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine.

V.3. in the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine SOU advocates a scientific approach to the choice of directions for the development of the armed forces, taking into account experience with local wars of recent decades.

V.4. SOU considers unacceptable any reduction of armaments or alteration of the organizational and manning structures of the forces which have not been scientifically evaluated.

#### **VI. The Concept for Transferring Military Personnel Who Are Citizens of Ukraine Back to Their Homeland**

In order successfully to transfer servicemen who are citizens of the Ukraine SOU considers it necessary:

VI.1. to sign an intergovernmental agreement on the reciprocal transfer of the aforementioned group of servicemen;

VI.2. to establish interstate, state and local committees for the return of citizens of Ukraine to the homeland, their distribution and employment;

VI.3. to provide financing for the transfer of these military personnel and their families through the establishment of a state fund;

VI.4. to take the following into account in the system for transferring military personnel:

- their specific contribution to the development of military science;
- their academic degree and rank;
- their professional military qualities;
- the availability of housing;
- whether or not the transfer is voluntary

#### **VII. SOU Activities in the Area of Social and Legal Protection for Military Personnel**

VII.1. SOU strives to see to the implementation of legislative enactments of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on the social and legal protection of military personnel.

VII.2. SOU considers it necessary to create an effective system of assistance for military personnel:

- when they are transferred to the homeland;
- when the military units are reduced or disbanded;
- with the resolution of housing problems;
- with the social adaptation of those released into the reserve

#### **VIII. SOU Activities in the Area of Military-Patriotic Work**

SOU activities in the area of military-patriotic work include:

VIII.1. promoting the idea of a rebirth of the national Ukrainian state and of spiritual and cultural enlightenment;

VIII.2. publicizing legislative enactments on the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the combat traditions of World War II, and furthering the development of Ukrainian military traditions;

VIII.3. instilling respect for the state symbols of Ukraine and for the state language.

VIII.4. studying and objectively illuminating Ukrainian military history and the development of a Ukrainian army;

VIII.5. restoring and popularizing Ukrainian military sports organizations and the Society for Assisting the Defense of Ukraine;

VIII.6. conducting undertakings to achieve quality predraft preparation of the civilian youth for service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and military-occupational orientation of the youth for entering VUZs;

VIII.7. participating in the establishment of an orderly system of initial military training as the primary stage in the mastery of military occupations and the achievement of professional preparedness;

VIII.8. participating in the restoration of memorials and the graves of those who died for Ukraine's independence, and establishing museums of Ukrainian army history.

#### **IX. The Economic Work of SOU**

IX.1. SOU has initiated the establishment of a Ukrainian military stock-exchange;

IX.2. SOU supports the establishment of small enterprises for the production of construction materials, housing construction and the production of manufactured goods and agricultural products;

IX.3. SOU advocates the establishment of a social and economic development fund;

IX.4. SOU takes an active part in the development of the ideology for conversion of the VPK [military-industrial complex] in Ukraine and in its execution.

SOU believes that establishing the Armed Forces of Ukraine and maintaining them at a level of fighting efficiency adequate for reliably protecting it from aggression from outside constitute one of the most important functions of the state and a cause for all the people.

During the period of development of a sovereign, united Ukraine and its armed forces, SOU, as an independent public organization advocating protection of the social and legal interests of military personnel, standing for protection of the social and legal interests of military personnel, operating within the framework of the Constitution and other legislative enactments, will support the protection of the social and legal interests of military personnel and their families, and will work to restore the national spirit of self-awareness, the culture, language, ways and customs of the peoples of Ukraine.

#### **Authors of the Draft**

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#### Crimean Officer Union Members Threatened

92UM1174B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
9 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Major Nikolay Nedelin: "You Will Not Intimidate Us"]

[Text] The confrontation is intensifying between supporters of the RDK [Crimean Republican Movement] and those who support the stand of "Crimea With Ukraine."

Among the latter is the Crimean Officers' Union of Ukraine, on whose activities many RDK activists are well informed.

While the SOU [Officers' Union of Ukraine] operates within the bounds laid out in the charter of the organization, which is registered with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, the RDK people do not shun the methods of the criminal world.

This is what Major Vladimir Dovgan, deputy chairman of the Crimean Officers' Union of Ukraine, told me:

"I was at home not long ago, when the telephone rang. A stranger's voice informed me that I needed to go immediately to the home of a man I knew. I dressed in a hurry, of course, and rushed off to meet the individual, since I had no idea that anything was wrong. I had met with the person before on service matters.

"Much to my surprise, I was told that the individual had been away on a temporary duty assignment for several days.

"I immediately returned home. I found... the door to my apartment partly broken-in. Apparently the housebreaker had not been able to finish the job in the "allotted time." It could have been otherwise, however."

This is how an officers pays for the truth which someone does not like.

There have been other incidents.

Six intoxicated youths attempted to start a fight when some officers belonging to SOU were returning from a meeting.

Since the decision has been made not to respond to acts of provocation, the fight planned by the RDK members was thwarted. One small clarification, to be sure: Lieutenant-Colonel Sergey Litvinov barely avoided a blow to the head with some brass knuckles.

A stranger approached the wife of Nikolay Skiba, a member of the Crimean SOU, and uttered just a few words:

"We shall kill your mongrel..."

This was in reference to her son. "What do the children have to do with it?" one asks.

Unknown people attempt to pressure and intimidate the wives of many officers who have taken the Ukrainian oath.

Major Sergey Kirsan's wife was advised to settle her husband down, to keep him out of politics. This is a literal quote: "Your husband is very active. Our people will come. They will take care of him first."

These are the conditions under which officers are forced to work in their very own land, those who do not want to accept the politics of those who attempt to sow international dissension. And it should be said that they believe firmly in their ideas. They will not be intimidated.

#### Carpathian Military Commissar on Callup

92UM1174A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
9 Jun 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel Menshikov, military commissar, by Major Sergey Nagoryanskiy, NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent, under the rubric "A Topical Interview": "The Carpathians Are Prepared to Serve Ukraine"]

[Text] The draftee decided to outfox the medical commission. He was 148 centimeters tall, and we know that draftees of that height are not accepted into the army. So he stretched his body, he was measured and a height of 150 centimeters was recorded. This came out at the assembly point, however, and the kid was told he would not be drafted. He begged them, almost with tears in his eyes: "Please take me. I won't let you down."

I began the interview with Vasiliy Menshikov with this incident.

[Nagoryanskiy] Vasiliy Semenovich, recently we have had increasing numbers of cases of a different kind: draftees trying a thousand and one ways to avoid the service. But here we have one who wants to serve, even though he could remain in the comfort of his parents' home and not experience the hardships of military life for a year and a half. Are patriots like him in the majority in the Carpathian area?

[Menshikov] Of course. I have spoken with many young men both prior to the induction and now, when it is underway. Generally speaking, they are ready both morally and physically. And the patriotic spirit is alive in them. There have been quite a few cases such as the one you mentioned. Just the other day I spoke with a young man who is exempt from the draft for family reasons: sick parents and a number of other problems. He too begged to serve. We cannot violate the law, however.

[Nagoryanskiy] Particularly the newly passed Law of Ukraine On Universal Military Duty and the Military Service.

[Menshikov] Without going into detail, I shall say that, among other things, it regulates the functioning of the military commissions more specifically. And we are seeing this right now, when the draft is for the first time exclusively for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It is going entirely according to plan. We have given special attention to the selection of replenishments for the National Guard, the Border Troops and the Navy.

[Nagoryanskiy] Incidentally, about the Navy.... I have in mind the Black Sea Fleet. A difficult situation has developed around it. Has this not affected the willingness of the youth to serve?

[Menshikov] Frankly, both the youth and their parents have been disturbed by this. Workers with the oblast commissariat have performed explanatory work, however. The naval recruitment plan was fulfilled as a result. As of now, at least.

[Nagoryanskiy] And just what does the explanatory work consist of, not just with respect to the navy, but in general?

[Menshikov] Primarily of personal talks with the draftees. Unfortunately, many of them have a poor understanding of the law, after all. This creates a number of difficulties. We take advantage of the mass media, among other things. I spoke on local television just prior to the draft, for example. Colonel Aleksey Ivanovich Turok, military commissar for the Mukachevo Combined Military Commissariat, held a round-table meeting for journalists, who wrote a report for the local newspaper PANORAMA. In addition, Aleksey Ivanovich has spoken on the radio more than once. One other thing, since we have brought up the military commissariat. Particularly since others can be judged from its example. Prior to the draft Colonel Turok requested that Orthodox Bishop Yefimiy instruct all the priests in all the churches in Mukachevo and the rayon during their sermons to ask all the parishioners to give pep talks to their sons at home. This request was satisfied. The clergy in many other rayons in the oblast also help us.

[Nagoryanskiy] There are around 11,000 veterans in the Carpathian area. Are they also involved in this work?

[Menshikov] Absolutely. Assistance committees have been set up in the military commissariats, whose members are mainly former frontline fighters and reserve officers. These committees have several sections. There is always one which deals with the draft. In addition, committees of soldiers' mothers also work actively with the committees. We recently assembled their representatives in the military commissariat for a round-table discussion. We discussed the joint work. Suggestions were made. For example, joint delegations will visit the troops during the summer training under the auspices of the military commissariats. Their members will include representatives from us and from local agencies of government, as well as members of the committee of soldiers' mothers. We shall get a look at how our compatriots are performing. Such visits were actually

made in the past too. They were irregular though, and there was no particular benefit. It will now be done systematically.

[Nagoryanskiy] Just before this interview, Vasiliy Semenovich, I visited the Khustskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, which is headed by Col Yury Ivanovich Romanenko. The makeup of the joint group has already been determined and the trip schedule established there. It will visit units in which many youth from Khost and the rayon are serving.

[Menshikov] It should be mentioned that this military commissariat is one of our best, a fact attested by how the draft is going. Both the military commissar himself, Lieutenant-Colonel Vladimir Ivanovich Moroz, chief of the second division, and other comrades put a lot into it. Perfectly naturally, the local authorities cooperate with them in all things. A graphic example was the assistance they provided with the construction of a new building for the military commissariat. Another important indication of their joint work is that Irina Vladimirovna Vaapova, chairman of the rayon draft commission, Lieutenant-Colonel Moroz and many other workers with the military commissariat were awarded monetary bonuses for last year's performance by decision of the oblast executive committee.

[Nagoryanskiy] Unfortunately, one does not frequently hear of some oblast noting a well-run induction. Even with certificates. And here you have monetary bonuses.

[Menshikov] And just why not? After all, the people put a lot of effort into it. The wear and tear on nerves is worth a lot. And although you cannot make up for it with money, we did award bonuses.

[Nagoryanskiy] If it is no secret, how much?

[Menshikov] From 600 to 1,000 rubles. Thanks to the local government, which allocated the money. Once again, incidentally, this is a result of our close communication with Dmitriy Fedorovich Dorchintsi, Sergey Ivanovich Ustich, Emil Fedorovich Landovskiy, Mikhail Ivanovich Kralo and other officials. Despite this, I must admit that not all of our cooperation can be described in rosy colors. This is because of factors generated by the difficult times. Life is expensive. There is little money. It might seem like an insignificant thing to get the youth to the assembly point (not to mention the really complicated matters). But just try to get gasoline. And we have to pick up some of our youth in mountainous areas. We find a way to do it though. If only we had more workers.

[Nagoryanskiy] What do you mean by that?

[Menshikov] First of all, do not think that I am complaining. That is not it. Our oblast military commissariat is supposed to be in the third category based on its mobilizational and induction resources. This calls for a larger number of workers and higher T/O levels for the military personnel. Last year we managed to raise four rayon military commissariats from third to second category. The military ranks of certain officers were raised accordingly. There were no other changes, however, including no increase in the manning table.

[Nagoryanskiy] And the work suffers...

[Menshikov] Luckily, we received support from those in charge, primarily from Major-General Anatoliy Vasiliyevich Palamarchuk, chief of the Directorate for Mobilization and Manning of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces. At a recent meeting with him we informed him of our problems and difficulties. He promised to look into the matter in detail and to help us. We have hope. One other thing, although it might seem that the subject has been talked to death. I have in mind the salary scales of our employees. They are beggarly in comparison with those in the civilian sector. There are many absurdities even in our structure. A driver earns less than a typist, for example. One has to give credit to the workers with the military commissariat, however. Even for that kind of money they work hard. With respect to the officers and warrant officers, I can say a good word about them too. About Lieutenant-Colonel Vladimir Aleksyevich Korshunov, and Captain Aleksandr Konstantinovitch Bespalko, and Senior Warrant Officer Nikolay Yuryevich Sentipal.

[Nagoryanskiy] Vasiliy Semenovich, let us get back to how the draft is going. You have already mentioned one specific feature: that the youth will serve only in Ukraine. Are there any others? Or any difficulties?

[Menshikov] In general, no. This is due to a certain degree to the fact that things are relatively calm in the Carpathian area. The people here are hardworking. They bring up their sons the right way. Incidentally, approximately two thirds of the draftees are from rural areas. That is, kids accustomed to physical labor. The service is therefore no burden to them.

[Nagoryanskiy] Do you really have no draft evaders?

[Menshikov] Unfortunately, there are some. Right now 60 individuals are being sought. This includes some who have been hiding from us since last year. Eleven have been convicted. The rest have been issued warnings by the public prosecutor.

Last year the medical personnel tightened their requirements. In the fall the number of individuals rejected for the draft was already greater than previously. We took this into account when we planned the current induction. What can I say? I studied several different indices. There has been a sharp increase in the number of youth with stomach ulcers and cardiovascular diseases. More of the young men have rheumatism. It is a suspicious fact that many illnesses worsened during the time between graduation and induction into the military.

[Nagoryanskiy] Vasiliy Semenovich, there is a large crowd here at the assembly point today. But there is order too. Do you get any "surprises"?

[Menshikov] We warned both the draftees and their parents about this in advance. In the past we have had send-offs turn into rowdy orgies and had to call in the police.

[Nagoryanskiy] But it is probably not enough just to warn people—to shake one's finger at them, so to speak.

[Menshikov] Naturally, we have therefore taken the following route. To avoid holding revelries right at the

assembly point—although we did conduct a small formal ceremony—we suggested that local authorities and the rayon military commissariats conduct send-off ceremonies there in the communities. And that is what was done. The ceremonies went well in Mukachevo and in the Nankovo and Vyshkovo rural soviets in Khust Oblast, for example.

[Nagoryanskiy] But is there anything, Vasiliy Semenovich, in the work of your oblast military commissariat about which you could brag, in the good sense of the word? Something which the others do not have, for example?

[Menshikov] In general, we never set ourselves the goal of amazing the world. That is a thing of the past—the initiatives, the appeals, the garish campaigns. Everyday work, well organized, is worth far more than a striking slogan. We did come up with one idea, to be sure, which we are beginning to implement. We are instituting military honor rolls in the military commissariats. They are similar to the unit honor rolls. In ours, however, along with photographs of young men who have served conscientiously, we are going to include pictures of their parents. This will be a history, if you like, of the military service of the rayon or the city. And that history begins with the first induction into the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We shall use these honor rolls in our indoctrinational work. Those whose names are entered there will always be announced in the local press and on the radio. I want to make it clear that we are not trying to exaggerate the significance of the honor rolls. They cannot serve as any means of persuasion in and of themselves. I believe that they can be of certain benefit, however. We also have some other ideas, purely practical and not simply for propaganda purposes. But we do not want to crow before we have crossed the hurdle.

[Nagoryanskiy] When you have crossed the hurdle and your success has grown, let the editors know. We shall be happy to publicize them.

#### Difficulties of Commercial Center in Obtaining Hardware for Sales

92U-M1174C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian  
9 Jun 92 p 4

[Commentary by Lieutenant-Colonel Georgy Vasiliyevich Kuznetsov, acting general director of the Commercial Center, recorded by Major Gennadiy Klyuchikov, under the rubric "The Military Reform: Ways to Enter the Market" "When an Old Vehicle Costs More Than a New One"]

[Text] It is possible actually to further the protection of servicemen only when one has the necessary financial resources. This is axiomatic. The only question is where to get the money. In this matter we are pinning great hopes on the Commercial Center set up a few months ago under the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. It would be difficult, of course, to expect the Commercial Center to have filled in this gap in the budget within such a brief time, a gap which developed as a result of the economic crisis and the disintegration of former business ties. However, we do have a right to count on a certain amount of assistance from the Commercial Center.

We asked Lieutenant-Colonel Georgiy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov, acting general director of the Commercial Center, to tell us how the development of this structure is proceeding.

We have accomplished quite a lot during the recent period. For example, the Universalionversiya international military stock exchange has been formed to conduct commercial activities on the international level, which will increase Ukraine's hard-currency earnings. We have succeeded in establishing reliable ties with numerous foreign partners and with our own.

We now have a realistic opportunity to make a certain contribution to the accomplishment of the program for protecting the servicemen. We are already in a position to allocate the money to buy 180 apartments, for example. There are some fairly good plans for the retraining and job-placement of servicemen about to be released into the reserve.

Right now I would like to talk about something else, however. Our Commercial Center is still not able to realize its full potential. The hindrance is occurring at many levels, but primarily in the directorates of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. They are unwilling to consign to us the military property and equipment to be sold through commercial structures.

They ordinarily give reasons such as the following:

The needs of the armed forces have not yet been calculated. We have to keep the military repair plants busy.

I cite the following example to illustrate the role of repair plants in the sale of equipment. A truck costs an average of one million rubles on the exchange, while the price of a fairly worn-out vehicle goes up to 1.5 million after undergoing repairs at a plant. Why do we need these services? Just to keep the repair plants busy? It would be easier and more profitable to sell the equipment without any repairs.

Furthermore, by inserting into the commercial chain a link like the repair plant we are creating yet another loop-hole for selling equipment without control, bypassing the Ministry of Defense.

Some directorates of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine want to set up and are already setting up their own commercial structures. The Directorate of Material Stocks of the Ministry of Defense's Construction Directorate, for example, has succeeded in getting through a directive allowing it to engage in commercial activities on its own. Attempts have been made to set up such structures also in the Air Force.

Even a nonspecialist knows, however, that this will inevitably lead to a weakening of control, which will result in a squandering of Ministry of Defense funds. It might be worthwhile finally to specify precisely who is to engage in commerce and who in combat training. Particularly since the laws On Social Protection for Servicemen and Their Families and On the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the president's Decree No. 28 of 31 December 1991 precisely specify who in the army is supposed to engage in commercial activities.

Taxes are a major hindrance in the functioning of the Commercial Center. Judge for yourself. There are enterprises in the state which are not taxed. Joint-stock companies in which the percentage of foreign capital is greater than that of domestic capital, for example. At the same time the Commercial Center of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, that most hapless and unprotected structure, is subject to the full tax load. We return to the state budget the residual value of the goods sold (10-30%) and also pay a 20% tax. We end up giving away up to 60% of our receipts. What is left for the Ministry of Defense? How can these remaining crumbs be of any real help in resolving the social problems?

I am certain that as long as there is such an acute housing problem in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it would be the right thing to exempt the Commercial Center from the payment of taxes or at least reduce them. God only knows how much money the state is losing from this. On the other hand, when we get on our feet, we will pay it all back and then some.

Now about another problem. The planned reduction of the armed forces could coincide with a worsening of the state's economic situation due to the disintegration of economic ties. Right now many officers can only dream of earning even as much as janitors or hairdressers. Receiving no understanding from the government of Ukraine with respect to rectifying their economic situation, many servicemen are starting to improve their standard of living on their own by engaging in commercial activities. And there would be nothing wrong with that if the items bought and sold were not, frequently, stolen military property.

In my opinion, we need to make a clear-cut decision either we create normal financial conditions enabling the servicemen comfortably to perform their service duties or the officers and warrant officers will resolve their financial problems themselves. In the latter case these businessmen in shoulder boards will not be stopped by any kind of orders.

We see it as one of the main tasks of the Commercial Center not only to resolve the housing problem but also to help servicemen released into the reserve to find jobs in commercial structures set up with the freed capital under the strict control of the corresponding directorates of the Ministry of Defense. This would require granting the Commercial Center complete control over this capital. Such commercial structures set up locally would make it possible not only to provide a comfortable existence for the servicemen but also allow the Ministry of Defense to earn a considerable amount of profit to be used for implementing social programs.

If the process of establishing commercial structures locally under the leadership of the Commercial Center continues to be drawn out, military enterprises will seek a way to enter the market on their own. We see the following as the solution. A certain portion of the capacities of military enterprises could continue to operate to meet the needs of the Ministry of Defense and the free part of the capacities would operate as a small enterprise.

In conclusion I want to underscore the main thing once again. It is that large programs can be accomplished only by centralizing large forces and funds. The scattering of these

funds by granting independence in the conduct of commercial operations can only result in significant financial losses. This is confirmed by the bitter experience of the Commercial Center of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the branches of which pilfered funds and each military unit sold property as it liked. As a result, not only did the USSR Ministry of Defense lose a considerable part of the funds from the sale of military property, but there was also considerable detriment to the level of combat readiness of the troops.

Do we need to repeat the mistakes of others and learn only from our own blunders? There should be no independent commercial structures in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. All decisions should be made exclusively by the directorates and services of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. It has all the information and knows the needs of the troops for this or that kind of equipment and supplies.

### BALTIC STATES

#### CIS Troops Set Up Operations Near Defense Ministry Posts

92UN477D *Vilnius EKHO LITVY* in Russian  
20 May 92 p 2

[ELTA report: "Information From the Ministry of National Defense"]

[Text] The Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania has reported that posts of foreign troops stationed in Lithuania are being set up next to the voluntary national defense posts. Troops from the CIS military post next to the voluntary national defense post in Garuava have been behaving offensively. On 19 May at about 1100 a helicopter flew over the post and a machine gun could be seen from its open door. The chief of staff of the Kaunas Command, the chief of the voluntary national defense detachment, and CIS Colonel Orlov went to this post. At 1250 the CIS military post was removed. One CIS policeman, one CIS military serviceman, and one voluntary national defense representative remained here. This morning a CIS post was established near the post of the Ministry of National Defense in Kaunas, on Baydoto Street.

According to information from the commander of Marijampole, CIS military posts have been established near the post of the Ministry of National Defense in Azaolu Bude (six armed military servicemen) and near the internal forces post on Kaunas Highway (four armed soldiers and officers).

It was reported that posts of armed CIS military servicemen have been set up also in Alytus next to the voluntary national defense posts on the road to Senai and also on the road to Kaunas.

#### Latvia's Navy Chief on Initial Actions of Latvian Patrol Boats

92UN605D *Riga DIENA* in Russian 3 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Gaydis Zeybota, chief of the Naval Forces Administration: "The Essence Is Not Armament"]

[Text] For the Latvian Republic's naval forces, June is associated with important events—12 June 1921 has

become the birthday of the naval fleet. On 12 June 1931 in Liepaja there was the first triumphant celebration of the fleet's 10-year anniversary, which was attended by military vessels from numerous states, testifying to the fact that Latvia had entered the unified family of European states.

The tasks of our new naval forces were defined by the state conception of defense. But I must remind you that the navies of all states also have one other responsibility—they fulfill diplomatic functions. The naval fleet and its personnel are official state representatives, just as the ships are the territory of this state, where all its rights and guarantees are in effect. This is specifically why the raising of the naval flag of the Latvian Republic on the first patrol vessel evoked a particular reaction among many states of Europe. The official visits to Riga by squadrons of military vessels from Germany, France, Denmark and NATO have already been scheduled. The visits by the naval attaches of England, Canada, Japan and India also proved that it is not the size of the fleet or the vessel and its armaments or tonnage that determine the authority of the state and the fleet, but rather the desire of each country to be free, to defend its independence and its wealth. This is the main thing. The rebirth of the Latvian fleet in the present situation has an extremely important principle significance in solving such political problems as the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces from Latvia today, when our patrol boats are taking over control and jurisdiction of the off-shore boundary line. Thus, the last reason justifying the presence of two brigades of naval border guards belonging to a foreign state in Liepaja and Ventspils is disappearing. Society must understand this fact, and try to help to the measure of its abilities. Unfortunately, we must say that often we do not receive support in the resolution of even the simplest questions. For example, up to the present day, our ships do not have a berth in the Liepaja port. The Russian armed forces command does not cooperate with us, and therefore we cannot expect any significant changes, since this is not in their interests. We must still prove the need for our existence.

Although the circumstances accompanying the rebirth of the naval forces are rather complex, they continue to be formed. The naval flag of the Latvian Republic already waves over two patrol boats, and soon they will be joined by two more. The Liepaja division is the first of three divisions under the command of I. Leshipskis to create its own structures. A portion of the equipment has been obtained and a command post is being created. But the main difficulty is the absence of cadres. There are few qualified specialists ready to devote their lives to the defense forces.

The Liepaja Instructional Center is operating under the leadership of I. Virga. At the present moment, a group of specialists are completing their studies there. Most of them have graduated from naval schools and work on vessels in the maritime fleet. After passing their exams, they will be qualified as instructors, and in individual cases will be awarded officer's ranks. The instructional center is preparing to train recruits, whose call-up to mandatory service is continuing.

At the present moment, it is an extremely significant fact that our vessels are going out on their first patrol runs. For

example, patrol boat 101, during its patrol in the Iben Straut, discovered a Russian border vessel which in violation of international law was at sea at 2240 hours without its running lights on. An inquiry regarding this matter was sent to the commander of the border naval forces, Lt-Gen V. Gaponenko.

The Latvian naval forces are ready to control the adherence to the "Law on the Latvian State Border" by ships and auxiliary vessels of the Russian naval fleet, as well as the statutes on the order of foreign vessels entering Latvian territorial waters and ports, and their presence and departure. This is very important, since today it is specifically the sea which is the main route which is not covered and along which the uncontrolled export of property may be performed. Therefore, the rapid creation of the naval forces must become an all-people's task. In turn, the sailors from the division are prepared to readily fulfill all service responsibilities, although quite often much is lacking in their present "house." But life moves forward, and we can say Latvia has its own naval forces.

## CAUCASIAN STATES

### Gambarov Orders Disbanding of Gyandzha Defense Committee

92L505774 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 30 May 92 p 1

[Text of "Order of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic 'On Disbanding the Emergency Defense Headquarters of the City of Gyandzha'"]

[Text] In order to bring the activities of armed formations existing in the Azerbaijan Republic in line with the requirements of legislation, ensure unified leadership and command and control in the armed forces, and strengthen military discipline, organization, and one-man management, I decree:

1. By 1 June 1992 to disband the Emergency Defense Headquarters of the city of Gyandzha, created in violation of the Law on Armed Forces of the Azerbaijan Republic.

2. To transfer armament, equipment, and material and financial assets belonging to the Gyandzha Emergency Defense Headquarters and its subunits to the republic's Ministry of Defense for use in the interests of the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijan Republic.

To transfer to the minister of defense of the Azerbaijan Republic specialists from among officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel serving in the Emergency Defense Headquarters of the city of Gyandzha and its subunits to the ranks of the regular armed forces under his subordination.

3. The minister of internal affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic and the minister of national security of the Azerbaijan Republic shall provide practical assistance to the head of executive power of the city of Gyandzha in disbanding the Emergency Defense Headquarters of the city of Gyandzha and transferring military subunits of the headquarters to the Armed Forces of the Azerbaijan Republic.

4. The ministers of defense and internal affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic and the head of executive power of the city of Gyandzha shall be responsible for execution of this order.

[Signed] *Exercising the Powers of President of the Azerbaijan Republic Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan Republic I. Gambarov*  
Baku, 27 May 1992

### Conflicting Reports on Karabakh Hostilities

PM2206125392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Captain V. Strugovets: "Fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh and 'Propaganda Sniping' in Moscow. Armenian and Azerbaijani Representatives Hold Press Conference"]

[Text] It seems that the principle of "catching up and overtaking the West", which once prevailed in our life, has been embodied in the sphere of the military conflicts building up in a number of parts of the former Soviet Union. In Nagorno-Karabakh in particular. The news which has come out of there in the past few days about the scale and form of the hostilities means that we should no longer be talking of a conflict but of a war—admittedly, one that has not yet been officially announced. Incidentally, these reports are highly contradictory and often mutually exclusive. It is only by constantly comparing them that we can work out the truth to a certain extent.

All this could equally apply to the press conferences I attended the other day at the Armenian and Azerbaijani plenipotentiary missions in Moscow. And, on the basis of the above, I asked the very same questions at both embassies as a point of principle.

So then, just what has caused this new escalation of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh? Who is to blame for "whipping it up"? As was to be expected, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are trying to accuse the other side of breaking the lull that had previously come about.

Thus, Azerbaijan's official spokesman Khikmet Gadzhizade stated that "the hostilities were resumed 8 June by an artillery bombardment from Nagorno-Karabakh of the Azerbaijani village of Barakhly and other villages. As a result, refugees have streamed into Baku. The Azerbaijani Armed Forces were forced to launch a counteroffensive 12 June." The Armenian side, according to Feliks Mamikonyan, its permanent representative in Moscow, assessed this as the "start of a large-scale offensive by Azerbaijani armed formations," in which "around 280 units of combat hardware, including 110 tanks, 'Grad' multiple rocket launchers, and other means of mass destruction obtained from Russian units are taking part." All these figures, he noted, have been taken from information from the Armenian Defense Ministry. It is well known that the Russian Ministry of Defense has totally refuted this report.

As for the Russians and Ukrainians taking part in the fighting on Azerbaijan's side, they are all citizens of the republic, according to a reply given to your correspondent's question by Niyazi Ibragimov, assistant to the president for

relations with the press. "The Russian-speaking population has set up an entire international battalion commanded by Vladimir Malinin. One of the fighters, Yuriy Kovalev, has been posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Azerbaijan."

Incidentally, while accusing its adversaries of using mercenaries, Armenia itself is doing the same thing. We have learned that the Nagorno-Karabakh self-defense forces include a group of people from the Baltics who have "traveled there voluntarily" without informing either their own government or the Armenian Government.

The actual hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region are being supplemented by a "news war." The reports employed in it can be compared to shells and rockets in terms of their effectiveness. Some of them—reporting medical experiments on hostages and dozens of people crushed under tank tracks—can be compared only to Nazi atrocities.

Both press conferences announced the "use of chemical weapons by the opposing side"—specifically, mustard gas and other general toxins—while categorically denying that their side was using them. So you can imagine yourself in the position of someone receiving only one-sided information.

But I view the contradictory press assessments following the discussions with representatives of the republics' leadership as being artificially whipped up and especially supported by government circles. The press is simply fully reflecting the contradictory nature of the views and judgments of their peoples' leaders, who are stepping up their combat operations while calling for peace.

Are different options for ending the confrontation possible? Judging by reports from official sources and statements made at the Moscow press conferences, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are convinced that there is only one option—peace talks. And both sides are constantly declaring their readiness to begin such talks on the basis of the principles elaborated by the CSCE. But the most important of these principles is the inviolability of postwar borders. On this basis, the position of Azerbaijan—which is demanding that Azerbaijani population centers seized by the Armenians (specifically, Lachin) be liberated before it will come to the negotiating table—is logical.

And here is one other, purely legal, point.

The Armenian leadership, while constantly accusing Azerbaijan of genocide against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, and while supporting the latter in every possible way, is nonetheless in no hurry to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh's self-proclaimed status as an autonomous republic. In the opinion of Feliks Mamikonyan, Armenian permanent representative in Russia, "this is not the most important issue today." But just who then is the Armenian Government helping? Merely Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian community? If so, then this constitutes blatant interference in a sovereign state's affairs, in my view.

But in the meantime, I would repeat, the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh goes on...

## MOLDOVA

### Moldovan Minister Follows Example of Ukraine on Army Formation

92UM1164A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian  
No 100, 30 May 92 p 7

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Ion Kostas, minister of defense of the Republic of Moldova, by Colonel Nikolay Mulyar, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "The Society": "Moldova's National Army: the First Steps"]

[Text] Chisinau—Following is a special interview of Lieutenant-General Ion Kostas, the minister of defense of the Republic of Moldova, for GOLOS UKRAINY.

#### Background information:

Ion Grigore Kostas was born into a peasant family in 1944. He spent eight years in Kazakhstan, where his parents were exiled. Returning to his homeland, he graduated from secondary school and then the Kharkov Higher Military Air School and the Military Air Academy imeni Gagarin. He has served at all the levels of command. At one time he headed Moldova's DOSAAF Central Committee and then the Ministry of Internal Affairs. From that post he was appointed minister of defense.

[Mulyar] Lieutenant-General, Sir, Several units have now taken the military oath of loyalty to the people of Moldova. On what basis are the armed forces being formed, where are they getting the equipment and armaments, and how are the personnel problems being resolved?

[Kostas] Ukraine set a good example for us in this matter. We nationalized some of the equipment and armaments located on our territory. We can already outfit one or two brigades with everything they need. Over the long term there will be no major problems with personnel, although there are some difficulties now, in the beginning. Around 3,000 Moldovan officers are now serving in the armed forces of the former USSR, including Ukraine. They will all find a place in our army.

[Mulyar] What are the proposed structure and numerical strength of Moldova's army?

[Kostas] Our republic occupies a small area and its economy is not as well developed as that of Ukraine, let us say, and we are therefore not capable of maintaining a large army. Even in this situation, however, we intend to form a motorized-rifle and an air brigade, PVO and communications brigades and other units and subunits. Distributed evenly over the republic's territory, they will form a territorial defense like the armed forces of Switzerland, whose experience we are studying. With respect to numerical strength, it is planned to have around 14,000-15,000 men.

[Mulyar] A rapprochement is evident between Moldova and Romania, particularly in the economic area. Will this same development occur in the military field?

[Kostas] Unquestionably. Romanian Prime Minister Ion Iliescu has announced that their nation is prepared to help us form our own army. It should be borne in mind, however,

that we shall extend our contacts not just with Romania, but also with other nations in which we find mutual understanding and support. Before we have formed our own higher military training system, we do not rule out the possibility of training officers in individual fields both in the CIS nations and in the USA, Italy and France.

[Mulyar] Military Minister, Sir, troops of the former Soviet Army remain on your nation's territory. Russia has assumed jurisdiction over them. What is to become of the troops? When will they be withdrawn from Moldova?

[Kostas] The remains of the 14th Army are under the CIS Supreme Command, while the rest of the forces have been placed under Moldova's jurisdiction. A draft agreement is presently being worked out, which will be signed by Moldova and Russia in the near future. Among other things, it defines the legal status of troops on our territory. They do not have the right to interfere in our internal affairs and are required to observe the laws of the Republic of Moldova and forbidden to engage in any actions violating Moldova's sovereignty. They will pay a tax for use of the air space and the leasing of land. Under the draft agreement the 14th Army is to leave the republic no later than June or July 1993.

[Mulyar] How are the numerous parties and movements affecting personnel of the national army? Will it be politicized as the Soviet Army once was?

[Kostas] The answer is an unequivocal "No." The Law of the Republic of Moldova on the Armed Forces clearly states that while serving in the regular forces, servicemen are forbidden to be members of parties or other social-political organizations. Our ministry of defense was depoliticized on the basis of this law. It is subordinate to the president, the parliament and the government of the republic. Its daily functioning is strictly governed by the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Moldova.

[Mulyar] Two other states have actually been formed within your state: Gagauzia and the Dniester Republic. Will the army of the Republic of Moldova be used against these unrecognized republics?

[Kostas] These republics were formed not by the people but by a handful of pretenders. In calling themselves the people's leaders, they are deceiving people and turning them against the legitimate agencies of state authority. The blood of innocent people is being shed as a result. I do not believe there will be a further escalation, however. We shall be able to preserve the republic's territorial integrity without using military force. We need an army not for combatting separatism but, as stated in the Law of the Republic of Moldova On Defense, "to defend the state in case of armed aggression and to secure the inviolability of its borders and air space."

[Mulyar] And the last question, Lieutenant-General, Sir. Ukraine and Moldova are close neighbors. We have a common border. What are the prospects for cooperation between the Moldovan and Ukrainian armies?

[Kostas] The very brightest. Colonel-General K. Morozov, Ukrainian minister of defense, and I studied together at a military VUZ. We still maintain contact. I believe that

despite constant pressure by imperial structures of the former Union, Ukraine has achieved a great deal of success in the establishment of its own armed forces. We shall cooperate with Ukraine in the military area.

#### Legal Basis for Cossack Volunteers in Dniester Region Defended

92UM1133A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 10 Jun 92 pp 1,2

[Article by Doctor of Juridical Sciences, Professor Gennadiy Melkov: "Mercenaries? Aggressors? Volunteers: Cossacks in the Dniester Conflict From the Point of View of International Law"]

[Text] The Dniester Region is one of the "hot spots" of the former USSR. Unfortunately, the armed conflict there is not abating and the list of killed is longer with each passing day. Russian Cossacks are also participating in the conflict. This fact at times causes no less passion than the conflict itself. Assessments of it are polarized but frequently demonstrate juridical ignorance.

It is extremely important to determine in what capacity Cossacks are acting in the Dniester conflict—as mercenaries, aggressors, or something else?

First of all, we will cite the most characteristic statements and assessments.

Union of Cossacks Ataman A. Martykov: "We will come to the assistance of the Russian people whose rights have been violated, no matter where they live."

Stavropol Union of Cossacks Council of Elders Member B. Chernyshev: "Cossacks are Russian people, therefore the fate of the Russian people, no matter where they are, is not inconsequential for them."

Rostov Oblast UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs] appealed to the Cossack Atamans "to refuse to recruit volunteers on the banks of the Dneister to support the opposing sides because such actions are being viewed (by whom?—it was not indicated—G.M.) as interference in the internal affairs of sovereign republics".

Moldovan President M. Snegur: "...since Cossacks have become involved in the Dniester Region conflict and the Russian Federation leadership has not responded to Kishinev's protests, Moldova, as a member of the UN, has the right to request international support, including from Romania."

A number of Romanian parties are demanding that their president introduce Romanian troops into Moldova "to defend the Romanian population from occupation by imperialist forces."

B. Vyzhutovich, IZVESTIYA: "The participation of Cossacks in the Dniester events—this is armed aggression against a sovereign state. Aggression encouraged by... the Russian Government." (italics mine—G.M.).

Does it turn out that the activities of the Cossacks in the Dniester Region provide the basis to accuse the Russian Government of armed aggression against Moldova? That

correspondent is clearly not familiar with the fundamentals of international law. The concept of "aggression" cannot pertain to any group of individuals (including armed or unarmed Cossacks) or to their activities. It applies exclusively to states—subjects of international law (Article 1 of the Definition of Aggression, adopted at the 29th UN General Assembly Session on 14 December 1974). These are the activities of states that qualify as acts of aggression: an invasion or attack of the armed forces of a state against the territory of another state; the bombardment of the territory of another state by the armed forces of a state; a blockade of ports or coasts; an attack by the armed forces of a state against the ground, naval, or air forces of another state; the use of armed forces that are on the territory of another state contrary to the terms provided for in accordance with agreements; and, actions of a state that offers its territory to another state for carrying out attacks against a third state. The Russian Federation cannot be blamed for any of these acts.

They are attempting to "try on" another assessment to the activities of the Russian Cossacks (the last paragraph of Article 3 of the Definition)—"the dispatching of armed bands, groups, regular forces or mercenaries, by a state or on behalf of a state, who carry out acts of the use of armed force against another state that are so serious in nature that they are equivalent to the acts listed above."

A legitimate question—has the Russian Federation and government really sent the Cossacks to the Dniester Region? Or are they acting there on behalf of the state? Of course not. The entire world knows that the Cossacks have voluntarily come to the defense of the Russian population in the Dniester Region. They arrived there without weapons and have obtained weapons from the Dniester Republic authorities.

So can you accuse the Cossacks of using armed force against another state—Moldova in the defense of the Dniester Republic for the purpose of its separation? Of course not, since the Dniester Region considers itself to be part of Moldova. Consequently, the paragraph of the definition of aggression to which the international law "experts" are attempting to refer cannot be tied to the actions of the Cossacks. Otherwise, both Romania and the United States would have already long ago raised this issue in the UN Security Council.

Let's now turn to the actions of the Russian Cossacks. Can we call protecting the Russian population in the Dniester Region "interference in the internal affairs of sovereign republics"? Under no circumstances. And here is why.

The Declaration on the Principles of International Law dated 24 October 1970 states: "No state should also organize, assist, incite, finance, encourage or permit armed, subversive, or terrorist activities that are directed at changing the order of another state through violence, or interfere in an internal struggle in another state".

The Russian Government does not intend to change the existing order and regime in Moldova. The Cossacks also do not intend to do so. So, just what do they want? The Russian Cossacks want to defend the Russians who do not desire to

be transformed into Romanians. (Incidentally, M. Druk does not conceal the desire to unite Moldova with Romania and has submitted his candidacy for the post of President of Romania).

To unite with neighbors or not—that is the sovereign right of the population of Moldova. But Moldova's ethnic minorities, including Dniester Region Russians, also enjoy that same inalienable right. Romanian President I. Iliescu also confirms that: "Romania supports all proposals that result in the peaceful resolution of the conflict and ensure the territorial integrity of Moldova with the observance of the rights of ethnic minorities."

The Russian Government is only guilty of having not yet developed a precise state policy with regard to the Russians who reside outside the borders of the Russian Federation. In this case, it has in no way officially expressed its attitude toward the participation of the Cossacks in the Dniester conflict. And, I repeat, it has no relationship whatsoever to the actions of the Cossacks.

How is it turning out? The Romanians can demand that their President introduce troops into Moldova "to defend the Romanian population from the occupation of imperialist forces". And the Russian Cossacks and, it turns out, the Dniester Region Russians themselves, cannot demand their own protection from the President of Russia? Or, maybe, more than 100 million Russians must observe with indifference the oppression of their blood brothers who live alongside their home? It is time to say at the top of our lungs that this will never happen. This position cannot be viewed as the imperial policy of the Russians or as the instigation of the deterioration of the situation. This is a normal concern for the fate of Russian ethnic minorities who reside in the former republics of the former USSR. A concern that is in total compliance with the standards of international law that have been consolidated in the UN Charter, the 1966 International Pact on Human Rights, and the 1975 Final Act and other CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] documents.

The Cossacks are also not ending up in the Dniester Region under the definition of mercenaries. In accordance with Article 47 of 1977 Supplementary Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Victims of War, a mercenary is any individual who has been especially recruited locally or abroad and who participates in combat operations and is guided primarily by a desire to obtain a profit. He (the individual) is not a citizen of the belligerent parties, is not in their armed forces, and has not been sent by his state to carry out any official duties whatsoever. I would like to see a person who dared to compare the Russian Cossacks, who are defending Russians in the Dniester Region, for example, with the Belgian mercenaries—the "wild geese" who fought in Africa.

Just who are the Cossacks? Volunteers. To whom apply all of the laws and customs of war and all of the standards of international law that are in force that apply to armed conflicts. The Cossacks in the Dniester Region are legal participants of a military conflict (combatants) in total compliance with Article 4 of the 1907 Hague Convention on

Laws and Customs of Land War and with the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Victims of War and the 1977 Supplementary Protocols I and II.

Do volunteers have the right to defend the Russian population in the Dniester Region as in any area of the former USSR? They certainly have a complete right. And let this not surprise the journalist who refers to standards of international law that he does not know and zealously demands that the Russian Government use its power "to stop the Cossacks". Even citizens of neutral states (by the way, right now there are only three in the world right now: Switzerland, Austria, and Malta), having officially stated their nonparticipation in an armed conflict, can enter the service of one of the belligerents as volunteers. Consequently, the Cossack volunteers can be in the Dniester Region and defend the Russian population entirely on legal grounds. And not only in the Dniester Region.

I, an international lawyer, am writing all of this of course not to pour oil on the fire of the conflict. Politicians, journalists, the Cossacks themselves, and all people need to

recall the standards of international law. And first of all—the former nomenclatura "comrades" from the CPSU, who also previously flouted the standards of international law in the Union and abroad and now, having become presidents of some sovereign republics, continue with ease to play with the fates of peoples.

As for specifically Moldova and the Dniester Region, the conflict must be settled as soon as possible by political means and in total accord with the UN Charter, the 1899 and 1907 Conventions on the Peaceful Resolution of International Clashes (they are also in force), the 1975 Final Act, and other CSCE documents, with total observance of human rights, ethnic minorities and the territorial integrity of Moldova. Moldova must guarantee on a treaty basis that the demographic situation in the Dniester Republic will not be deliberately changed by resettling Moldovans there or by driving off Russians. This is necessary so that the Russian ethnic minority can make its own choice in the event of the future unification of Moldova and Romania. There is simply no other way.

## ARMS TRADE

**Former Soviet Hardware at Fire Sale Prices**  
92UM1169A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 15 Jun 92 p 3

[Unattributed ITAR-TASS Article: "Arms Exports: They Are Selling Everything, Cheap and to Everyone"]

[Text] At the present time, the authorities of a number of CIS states are conducting active trading of arms from the former Soviet Army, and this trading can be called "the largest clearance sale that ever took place in the world", writes the French weekly magazine LE FIGARO.

In an article entitled "Scrap Metal Dealers", the magazine confirms the information that is arriving in the capitals of Western countries during the first months of 1992 and permits us to compose a quite definite picture: "The military-industrial complex of the former USSR which, as before, is being managed by communists at all levels, has established significant influence in Moscow, and President Boris Yeltsin has been compelled to submit to its pressure".

"At the beginning of March 1992," the magazine continued, "the Russian President signed an Decree sanctioning the sale abroad of 1,600 combat aircraft and 'this is three times the number of the entire French Air Force'." And that was not an isolated initiative. Russia is selling shipments of thousands of T-55 tanks at scrap metal prices, \$5,000 per ton. Any Third World dictator who has found himself without resources can thus create a powerful tank force for himself.

Other republics of the former USSR are following Russia's example. So, Georgian authorities have signed a secret contract with an "intermediary" from Switzerland that grants him the right to sell SU-25 bombers which are produced in Tbilisi.

In May, at an air base near Barcelona, cases occurred of the sale of Soviet-built MIG-21 aircraft for \$20,000 and they offered the MIG-29, the most modern Soviet aircraft, for \$100,000. The ingenuity of the arms dealers from the military industrial complex of the former USSR knows no bounds. They are proposing the acquisition Soviet nuclear submarines to Third World countries that are experiencing difficulties supplying electricity in order to use them... as floating electrical power plants.

The polemics that have developed between Russia and Ukraine surrounding the Black Sea Fleet have recently taken a curious turn: 49 surface vessels and submarines from its complement have already been secretly sold abroad. A company located in Naples has acquired a destroyer and two submarines, a Turkish firm has acquired three aircraft and 18 submarines, and India has received a cruiser. The Russian "Nikonzyud" Trading Company is carrying out these operations and many high-ranking officers are on its administrative council, including the commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Another example of the feverish "privatization" with which the former nomenklatura has now become involved is the roughly 15 former senior CPSU Central Committee officials who tried, under

the cover of various firms, to take control of numerous military enterprises and facilities, including Vnukovo-3, a military airfield near Moscow, and a satellite surveillance base.

The weekly has established that Kazakhstan is actively involved in the world arms trade. Alma-Ata plans to begin exporting SU-24MK bombers. The report of the disappearance of six nuclear warheads from military installations located in Kazakhstan is even more serious. An investigation conducted by the Western intelligence services permitted the establishment of their purchaser: it was Iran.

LE FIGARO asserts that Teheran has in general now been transformed into one of the largest importers of Soviet military equipment. Deliveries from the former USSR are being carried out through Turkmenistan. Artillery pieces, Scud missiles, submarines and spare parts from the former USSR have also been delivered to Iran... Today, thanks to the CIS states, Iran has at its disposal an army superior in weaponry to that which the Teheran regime had in 1980 prior to the beginning of the war with Iraq.

The magazine cites an unnamed representative of the military-industrial complex who declared, "Today our advantage consists of the fact that our trade is no longer linked to any ideological barriers whatsoever. Our arms are a real sack of gold that we are sitting on and we must take advantage of it".

## DEFENSE INDUSTRY

**Almaz Military Shipyard to Build Ecology-Oriented Ships**

PM2606114Q Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 26 Jun 92 First Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent Yuriy Kukanov: "Tarantul Changes Course"]

[Text] Only quite recently the strict censor's pencil would vigilantly strike out of newspaper articles the very name of the "Almaz" shipbuilding firm. And the "Tarantul" program under which naval patrol boats were produced here was very secret. And now Admiral Kime, commander of the U.S. Coast Guard, is boarding a ship built on Petrovskiy Island in the mouth of the Neva. He was shown the name ship of a new project—the prototype for the future multi-purpose coast guard ship. The "Almaz" specialists have fitted it with new systems making it possible to wage an effective struggle against violators of maritime borders, poachers, and polluters of the environment.

In the sea of conversion "Tarantul" is steering a course toward ecology. The firm has become a participant in the government program within whose framework it has started to build ships for monitoring the state of Russia's water environment. A small cutter, equipped with an ecological reconnaissance and monitoring complex, will work in the waters of the Neva and Neva bay. A 100-tonne "laboratory" is designed for Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland. A project is being developed for a 600-tonne floating ecological laboratory which will study the sea expanses.

Next year the "Almaz" shipbuilders intend to commission Russia's first high-speed 100-seat passenger catamaran. In the long term they will replace the currently familiar hydrofoils, which have an adverse effect on the environment.

## SECURITY SERVICES

### Military Units Transferred to Border Protection Service

92UM1163D Kiev RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian  
20 May 92 p 2

[Report from the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine: "Military Posts—to the Border Guards?"]

[Text] Under a directive of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine certain military units and military posts in the

Odessa and Carpathian military districts will be transferred to the State Committee for Protection of the State Border of Ukraine by 15 June 1992.

The units will be transferred along with the personnel currently on the roster, supplies and equipment corresponding to the preexisting establishment, barracks and billeting, furniture, communal facilities, equipment, training facilities and the housing stock. In accordance with a requisition from the State Committee for Protection of the State Border of Ukraine the necessary number of additional junior specialists and young replenishments from the spring 1992 induction will also be allocated for manning the formations and units of border troops.

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